Security protocols for mobile ubiquitous e-health systems by Picazo Sánchez, Pablo
Security Protocols for Mobile Ubiquitous
E-Health Systems
Autor: Pablo P icazo Sa´nchez
Directores: Dr. Pedro Peris Lo´pez
Dr. Juan M. Este´vez Tapiador
Firma del Tribunal Calificador:
Presidente:
Vocal:
Secretario:
Calificación:
Leganés, de de

A mis padres

Abstract
Wearable and implantable medical devices constitute an already established industry
nowadays. According to a recent research [113], North America is currently the
most important market followed by Europe, Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world.
Additionally, the same document remarks the importance of the Asia-Pacific region
due to the rising ageing population and the overpopulation in that area. The most
common implantable medical devices include pacemakers, defibrillators, cochlear
implants, insulin pumps, and neurostimulators among others.
In recent years, the proliferation of smartphones and other mobile “smart” devices
with substantial computational and communication capabilities have reshaped the
way wireless body area network may be implemented. In their current generation
(or in a near future), all of them share a common feature: wireless communication
capabilities [127]. Moreover, implantable medical devices have the ability to support
and store telemetry data facilitating the remote monitoring of the patient. Medical
devices can be part of a wireless body area network, operating both as sensors and
as actuators and making decisions in real time.
On the other hand, a new kind of devices called wearables such as smart bracelets
or smart watches have been equipped with several sensors like Photoplethysmogram
(PPG) to record the heart beats, accelerometers to count the steps or Global Po-
sitioning System (GPS) to geopositioning users and were originally conceived as
cheap solutions to help people to improve their workout. However these devices
have demonstrated to be quite useful in many healthcare environments due to a
huge variety of different and low-cost medical sensors. Thus, patients can be moni-
tored for long periods of time without interfering in their daily life and taking their
vital signs constantly under control.
Security and privacy issues have been described as two of the most challenging
problems of implantable medical devices and, more generally, wireless body area
networks [6, 47, 84, 103]. As an example, it has been demonstrated that somebody
equipped with a low cost device can eavesdrop on the data exchanged between a
reader and a peacemaker and may even induce a cardiac arrest [71]. Health-related
data have been the focus of several attacks almost since the adoption of computers
in the healthcare domain. As a recent example, in 2010 personal data from more
than 26 millions of veterans were stolen from the Department of Veterans Affairs’
database in the US by an employee who had access to the database [104]. The
Ponemon Institute pointed out that Germany and the US spent in 2013 more than
$7.56 and $11 millions, respectively, to protect personal health records from attacks.
This PhD dissertation explores the security and privacy of data in healthcare
environments where confidential information is measured in real time by some sen-
sors placed in, on, or around the human body. Security and privacy in medical
conditions have been widely studied by the research community, nonetheless with
the recent boom of wearable devices, new security issues have arisen.
The first part of this dissertation is dedicated to the introduction and to expose
both the main motivation and objectives of this PhD Thesis. Additionally the
contributions and the organization of this document are also presented.
In the second part a recent proposal has been analysed from the security and
v
privacy points of view. From this study, vulnerabilities concerning to full disclosure,
impersonation, traceability, de-synchronization, and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
have been found. These attacks make the protocol infeasible to be introduced with
an adequate security and sufficient privacy protection level. Finally, a new protocol
named Fingerprint+ protocol for Internet of Thing (IoT) is presented, which is based
on ISO/IEC 9798-2 and ISO/IEC 18000-6C and whose security is formally verified
using BAN logic.
In the third part of this dissertation, a new system based on International Stan-
dard Organization (ISO) standards and security National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) recommendations have been proposed. First, we present a mu-
tual entity authentication protocol inspired on ISO/IEC 9798 Part 2. This system
could be deployed in a hospital where Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tech-
nology may be used to prune blood-handling errors, i.e., the identities of the patients
and blood bags are confirmed (authentication protocol) and after that the match-
ing between both entities is checked (verification step). Second, a secure messaging
protocol inspired on ISO/IEC 11770 Part 2 and similar to that used in electronic
passports is presented. Nowadays the new generation of medical implants possess
wireless connectivity. Imagine a doctor equipped with a reader aims to access the
records of vital signals stored on the memory of an implant. In this scenario, the
doctor (reader) and the patient (implant) are first mutually authenticated and then
a secure exchange of data can be performed.
The fourth part of this Thesis provides an architecture based on two crypto-
graphic protocols, the first one is for publishing personal data in a body area network
composed of different sensors whereas the second one is designed for sending com-
mands to those sensors by guaranteeing the confidentiality and fine-grained access
control to the private data. Both protocols are based on a recently proposed public
cryptography paradigm named ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption scheme
which is lightweight enough to be embedded into wearable devices and sensors. Con-
trarily to other proposals made on this field, this architecture allows sensors not only
to encrypt data but also to decrypt messages generated by other devices.
The fifth part presents a new decentralized attribute based encryption scheme
named Decentralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Searchable Encryption that
incorporates ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with keyword search over
encrypted data. This scheme allows users to (a) encrypt their personal data collected
by a Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) according to a policy of attributes; (b)
define a set of keywords to enable other users (e.g., hospital stuff) to perform en-
crypted search over their personal (encrypted) data; (c) securely store the encrypted
data on a semi-honest server and let the semi-honest server run the (encrypted)
keyword search. Note that any user can perform a keyword query on the encrypted
data, however the decryption of the resulting ciphertexts is possible only for users
whose attribute satisfy the policy with which the data had been encrypted. We
state and prove the security of our scheme against an honest-but-curious server and
a passive adversary. Finally, we implement our system on heterogeneous devices
and demonstrate its efficiency and scalability
Finally, this document ends with a conclusions achieved during this PhD and a
summary of the main published contributions.
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Resumen
Los dispositivos médicos implantables como los marcapasos o las bombas de in-
sulina fueron concebidas originalmente para controlar automáticamente ciertos pa-
rámetros biológicos y, llegado el caso, poder actuar ante comportamientos anómalos
como ataques cardíacos o episodios de hipoglucemia. Recientemente, han surgido
uno dispositivos llamados wearables como las pulseras cuantificadoras, los relojes
inteligentes o las bandas pectorales. Estos dispositivos han sido equipados con un
número de sensores con capacidad de monitorizar señales vitales como el ritmo
cardíaco, los movimientos (acelerómetros) o sistemas de posicionamiento (GPS) en-
tre otros muchas opciones, siendo además una solución asequible y accesible para
todo el mundo.
A pesar de que el propósito original fue la mejora del rendimiento en activi-
dades deportivas, estos dispositivos han resultado ser de gran utilidad en entornos
médicos debido a su amplia variedad de sensores. Esta tecnología puede ayudar
al personal médico a realizar seguimientos personalizados, constantes y en tiempo
real del comportamiento de los pacientes, sin necesidad de interferir en sus vidas
cotidianas.
Esta Tesis doctoral está centrada en la seguridad y privacidad en entornos médi-
cos, donde la información es recogida en tiempo real a través de una serie de sensores
que pueden estar implantados o equipados en el propio paciente. La seguridad y la
privacidad en entornos médicos ha sido el foco de muchos investigadores, no obs-
tante con el reciente auge de los wearables se han generado nuevos retos debido a
que son dispositivos con fuertes restricciones de cómputo, de memoria, de tamaño o
de autonomía.
En la primera parte de este documento, se introduce el problema de la seguridad
y la privacidad en el paradigma de Internet de las cosas y haciendo especial hin-
capié en los entornos médicos. La motivación así como los principales objetivos y
contribuciones también forman parte de este primer capítulo introductorio.
La segunda parte de esta Tesis presenta un nuevo protocolo de autenticación
basado en RFID para IoT. Este capítulo analiza previamente, desde el punto de
vista de la seguridad y la privacidad un protocolo publicado recientemente y, tras
demostrar que carece de las medidas de seguridad suficientes, un nuevo protocolo
llamado Fingerprint+ compatible con los estándares de seguridad definidos en el
estándar ISO/IEC 9798-2 y EPC-C1G2 (equivalente al estándard ISO/IEC 18000-
6C) ha sido propuesto.
Un nuevo sistema basado en estándares ISO y en recomendaciones realizadas
por el NIST ha sido propuesto en la tercera parte de esta Tesis. En este capítulo
se presentan dos protocolos bien diferenciados, el primero de ellos consiste en un
protocolo de autenticación basado en el estándar ISO/IEC 9798 Part 2. A modo
de ejemplo, este protocolo puede evitar problemas de compatibilidad sanguínea, es
decir, primero se confirma que el paciente es quien dice ser y que la bolsa de sangre
realmente contiene sangre (proceso de autenticación). Posteriormente se comprueba
que esa bolsa de sangre va a ser compatible con el paciente (proceso de verificación).
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El segundo de los protocolos propuestos consiste en un protocolo seguro para el
intercambio de información basado en el estándar ISO/IEC 11770 Part 2 (el mismo
que los pasaportes electrónicos). Siguiendo con el ejemplo médico, imaginemos que
un doctor equipado con un lector de radiofrecuencia desea acceder a los datos que
un dispositivo implantado en el paciente está recopilando. En este escenario tanto
el lector como el implante, se deben autenticar mutuamente para poder realizar el
intercambio de información de manera segura.
En el cuarto capítulo, una nueva arquitectura basada en el modelo de Publish/-
Subscribe ha sido propuesto. Esta solución está compuesta de dos protocolos, uno
para el intercambio de información en una red de área personal y otro para poder
reconfigurar el comportamiento de los sensores. Ambos protocolos están diseñados
para garantizar tanto la seguridad como la privacidad de todos los datos que se
envían en la red. Para ello, el sistema está basado en un sistema de criptografía
de clave pública llamado Attribute Based Encryption que es suficientemente ligero
y versátil como para ser implementado en dispositivos con altas restricciones de
cómputo y de memoria.
A continuación, en el quinto capítulo se propone una solución completamente
orientada a entornos médicos donde la información que los sensores obtienen de
los pacientes es cifrada y almacenada en servidores públicos. Una vez en estos
servidores, cualquier usuario con privilegios suficientes puede realizar búsquedas
sobre datos sifrados, obtener la información y descifrarla. De manera adicional,
antes de que los datos cifrados se manden a la nube, el paciente puede definir una
serie de palabras claves que se enlazarán a los datos para permitir posteriormente
búsquedas y así obtener la información relacionada a un tema en concreto de manera
fácil y eficiente.
El último capítulo de esta Tesis se muestran las principales conclusiones obtenidas
así como un resumen de las contribuciones científicas publicadas durante el período
doctoral.
Palabras Clave: Seguridad, Privacidad, Criptografía, eHealth.
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Introduction
1.1 Context
The term IoT refers to a combination of Internet and small objects or devices, usually
equipped with a wireless connection, whose main purpose is to sense and react
automatically to some previously defined environmental changes [115, 156, 161].
Those devices are known as things and might have some embedded sensors and
actuators. In this Thesis, only those devices related to human body surveillance are
referenced such as Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) or wearables, however there
are many others such as small device placed somewhere inside the car in charge of
taking the driver’s eyes under control to stop the car in case she is falling sleep or
even a humidity sensor placed under the field to know if the automatic irrigation
should be turned on or not.
The IoT was originally inspired by RFID technology which is widely used for
tracking applications [97]. However, cooperation and interaction between sensors,
actuators, mobiles phones or RFID tags have been demonstrated to be a perfect
solution not only for tracking purposes but also for monitoring, automatic data col-
lection and data sharing activities. Smart hospitals, smart cities or smart buildings
are only a few examples in which IoT technology is thought to be included.
The proliferation of affordable wearable devices has increased the amount of
personal data that can be easily collected, processed and stored. Providing adequate
protection to such data has become a challenging task. As an example, in the
Six Nations rugby championship 2015, an IoT solution was deployed in a stadium
equipped with a WiFi connection and millions of data were measured directly from
the players only by wearing some wireless sensors in the shirt, boot, wrist or in a
chest band. Moreover, not only anyone equipped with a smartphone with a WiFi
connection is able to consume those data in real time from her favourite player but
coaches can also track their players to improve their performance [139].
From a more technical point of view, things in IoT are characterized by the
next capabilities: connectivity, identification, localization, mobility, hardware con-
straints, software developments and security and privacy issues. The mentioned
capabilities are explained bellow.
Connectivity. Objects have the ability to be connected to Internet or even with
other things in the same network. Wireless technologies such as WiFi, RFID,
Bluetooth, Near Field Communication technology (NFC), Global System for
Mobile communication (GSM), WBAN, ZigBee, General Packet Radio Service
(GPRS), Wide Area Network (WAN) or 3G play a key role in the IoT deploy-
1
1. Introduction
ment. Due to the huge amount of new devices that IoT will bring, Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is becoming more and more important in this new
paradigm.
Identification. Objects should be unique and identifiable when necessary. This
identification process is done physically trough RFID/NFC technologies or by
a combination of some attributes which make each device unique.
Localization & Mobility. Another interesting property that things have is the
location capability, i.e., objects are always geo-positioned trough GPS, GSM,
RFID or WiFi technologies. Furthermore, in a real scenario, objects may move
around, joining and leaving new networks and thus handling this mobility is
a must in IoT.
Hardware. Current tendency in IoT is to build objects as small as possible with-
out losing any of the capabilities that they already have. For example, when a
new wearable is being developed, users’ wishes are data security, data storage,
different communication protocols, long-life battery, price or the external ap-
pearance among many other properties. All these requirements are not easy
to be achieved and the research community has a real challenge with IoT.
Software. Objects have a set of chips which can be reconfigured to perform some
actions. Many others are equipped with a Central Processing Unit (CPU) and
thus developers can develop new algorithms to compute some operations in the
own device before doing something else with the information. In other words,
objects are thought to collect information about their surroundings, store it,
forward it or do some extra actions by developing some artificial intelligence,
routing, or security algorithms.
Security & Privacy. Security and privacy issues are described in the literature
as one of the most challenging problems that IoT has. Sensors, actuators
and personal information must be secured, however there are some physical
constraints that must be taken into account like computational, power and
memory restrictions that IoT have. Moreover, this is even more dramatic in
eHealth1 environments because devices are measuring personal data which can
be stored in external servers and thus, the information should be encrypted
once the data is measured in the own device.
According to an European report life expectancy has increased enormously in
the last century. In 1900, people were expected to live around 50 years whereas
at the end of the century, life expectancy was around 75 and 81 years old for men
and women respectively. This increment was originated mainly by the improvements
taken in both the communicable diseases at young ages and in cardiovascular diseases
[22]. Spain has increased its life expectancy from 72.5 in 1980 to 82.5 in 2012
which gives it the 12th position in the rank of the World Health Organization [163].
Furthermore, if we consider life expectancy over the world, the average has grown
from 46.6 years in the 1950s to 67.6 years in 2005.
IMDs are widely used nowadays. Each year more than 300,000 people in the U.S.
have at least one of these devices inside their human body and it is estimated that
more than 2.5 million people have one of them. One of the most known devices is a
1Term used to refer tools and services using Information and Communication Technologys
(ICTs)
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RFID tag developed by VeriChip Corp. and approved in 2004 to be implantable in
the human body. However it is not the only IMD, cardiac pacemakers, defibrillators,
neuro stimulators, cochlear implants, drug delivery systems (insulin pumps) or bionic
implants are only a subset of these devices. Usually, an external device may set up
some IMD parameters and extract stored data via wireless communication.
On the other hand, a new set of devices called wearables have proliferated nowa-
days as an affordable solution to monitor some biological signals. The most common
include smart bracelets, smart watches or smartphones. In their current generation
(or in the near future), all of them will share a common feature: wireless commu-
nication capabilities [127]. Moreover, both IMDs and wearables have the ability to
support and store telemetry data an thus the remote monitoring of the patient will
be performed easily.
As an example, devices with telemetry functionalities and more precisely in-
gestible IMDs equipped with radio frequency antennas have been proposed in several
works as a promising option for the gastrointestinal endoscopies [5, 42, 99].
Further to the above considerations, different reports point out that the IMDs and
the healthcare IoT market segment are ready to manage about $70 billion in 2018
[155] and $117 billion by 2020, respectively. Applications like fall detection, medical
fridges tracking, sportsmen care, patients surveillance or drug administration are
only a few examples of the vast possibilities that IoT might contribute to healthcare
[114].
In a near future, population age will be increased significantly and, in terms of
the economy, the cost of having particular nurses or particular medical doctors to
attend patients at home is unaffordable. Population is becoming older and therefore,
some mechanism to remote monitoring of vital signals will be a must for those people
who need to be constantly monitored but are not kept in the medical center.
Technology, and more particularly IoT, is already playing a main role in health-
care systems and many countries over the world are moving towards eHealth systems
to jump the gap between patients’ daily life and medical entities such as doctors or
care givers. Additionally, eHealth will be quite important in many other situations
such as countries in which socio-economical problems do not allow them to improve
in their health system or people who have mobility restrictions because of physical
or geographical conditions [162]. Despite the union of technology and health systems
has generated several challenges [34], eHealth has much more advantages that we
would have never imagined such as real-time access to the patients’ biosignals and
the ability to make decisions for some emergency situations [27], a huge amount of
data to research and to improve new drugs or solutions to some diseases.
Apart from the above advantages, eHealth systems are also capable of storing bio-
logical signals and forwarding them to a centralized server which might be physically
located in a hospital or even in a public cloud server. Important companies such as
Microsoft with its project named Microsoft HealthVault or Intel and Dell which are
collaborating with Meditech2 for a healthcare cloud system. Health records store
in the cloud are known as Electronic Health Records (EHRs)3. This is particularly
useful because the researchers, caregivers, medical staff or any other authorized en-
2https://ehr.meditech.com/
3Also known as Personal Health Records (PHRs)
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tity can access to those records at any time and anywhere with the guarantee that
those records are always updated and reliable. Additionally, EHRs should also have
the possibility to be linked with their owners in case it was necessary.
Server grant access and access by roles should be implemented in order to pre-
serve data privacy, e.g., a cardiologist should be able to access to heart data however
she should not access to audiometry data. Nonetheless some more complex scenarios
should be taken into account, for example those in which a cardiologist would need
some audiometry data. In that case she would ask for permission to an otolaryngol-
ogist to be allowed to retrieve that information otherwise she would not have access
to that personal information.
There are two different organizations in charge of defining the future standards for
eHealth such as security and privacy issues, interoperability of the devices, medical
data sharing or the nomenclature of medical data records: the ISO and the Health
Level 7 consortium (HL7).
1.2 Motivation and Objectives
In recent years, the proliferation of smartphones and other mobile smart devices with
substantial computational and communication capabilities have reshaped the way
WBANs may be implemented. WBANs may be defined as a set of networked sensors
(they have communication capabilities and can interact with each other and with a
central network controller that provides coordination, long-term storage, etc.) which
are over a patient and are constantly measuring various health-related parameters.
In a more general way, WBANs may be seen as a consequence of the union of IoT
and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) technologies applied to the eHealth world
[105].
The IoT are extremely vulnerable to attacks because most of the communications
are wireless, which makes eavesdropping extremely simple. Also, most of the IoT
devices such as RFID tags are characterized by their tight constraints in terms of
memory, energy and computing resources. Therefore these devices cannot support
on-board complex security algorithms. Apart from the insecurity of using the radio
channel the major security problems concern to authentication and data integrity.
For example, the theft of newborn children is a worldwide problem that has recently
made the news. It is claimed that in the last 50 years more than 300,000 newborns
were abducted in Spain [112]. Similar cases have been reported in Australia [51],
while in the US the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children has published
some statistics about this alarming problem [120]. To address this problem, several
hospitals in different countries have adopted a new and controversial RFID-based
solution due to the potential benefits that this technology could offer, both in terms
of savings in operational costs and as enablers of novel applications [13, 108, 152,
165, 172].
From the security point of view of the personal data, in 2010 more than 26
millions of PHRs of veterans were stolen from the Department of Veterans Affairs’
database in the US by an employee who had access to the server [104]. On the other
hand, it has been demonstrated that somebody equipped with a low cost device can
eavesdrop on the data exchanged between a pacemaker and a reader may induce
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security recommendations for IoT systems and more specifically for healthcare
environments.
O3. Create a suitable model to exchange data securely on a WBAN where all
sensors may encrypt and decrypt data. Additionally a mechanism to send
command operations to the sensors should be developed in order to allow
device reconfiguration in a secure way.
O4. Develop a complete system for eHealth system where PHRs are encrypted
and stored on an external server where users may retrieve a subset of PHRs
by performing encrypted queries to the database.
1.3 Main Contributions
During this PhD several contributions in the field of security and privacy on WBANs
have been published. As a result of the achievement of the aforementioned objectives
four main contributions have been accomplished:
C1. The IoT is an emerging paradigm which is used to link physical objects with
Internet. One of the most common ways of communicating and identifying ob-
jects on IoT is using RFID systems between different objects. Researchers have
focused on developing improvements of RFID authentication protocols that
stave off privacy threats and well-known security problems. Recently, Khor
et al. [93] have proposed a new authentication protocol which conforms to
the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (EPC-C1G2) standard (equivalently ISO/IEC
18000-6C). In Chapter 2 the vulnerabilities of this authentication protocol
concerning to full disclosure, impersonation, traceability, de-synchronization,
and DoS attacks are shown. These attacks make the protocol infeasible to
introduce it with an adequate security and sufficient privacy protection level.
Finally, we present a new protocol, called Fingerprint+ protocol, which is
based on ISO/IEC 9798-2 and ISO/IEC 18000-6C and whose security is for-
mally verified using BAN logic. This work was published in the Security and
Communication Networks journal [135] .
C2. RFID systems are widely used in access control, transportation, real-time
inventory and asset management, automated payment systems, etc. Never-
theless, the use of this technology is almost unexplored in healthcare environ-
ments, where potential applications include patient monitoring, asset trace-
ability and drug administration systems, to mention just a few. RFID tech-
nology can offer more intelligent systems and applications, but privacy and
security issues have to be addressed before its adoption. This is even more
dramatic in healthcare applications where very sensitive information is at stake
and patient safety is paramount. Wu et al. [164] have recently proposed a new
RFID authentication protocol for healthcare environments. In Chapter 3 is
shown that this protocol puts location privacy of tag holders at risk, which is a
matter of gravest concern and ruins the security of this proposal. To facilitate
the implementation of secure RFID-based solutions in the medical sector, two
new applications (authentication and secure messaging) are suggested and we
propose solutions that in contrast to previous proposals in this field, are fully
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based on ISO Standards and NIST Security Recommendations. This research
culminated in an article published in the Journal of Medical Systems [134].
C3. A complete secure architecture to share private data for IMDs and wearables
on a WBANs is proposed. The WBAN is thus viewed as a shared bus where
a number of entities produce data and subscribe to the data feed provided by
other entities. In Chapter 4, two protocols for publishing data and sending
commands to a sensor that guarantee confidentiality and fine-grained access
control are presented. These protocols are based on a kind of public cryptog-
raphy called ABE and more specifically CP-ABE scheme which is lightweight
enough to be embedded into wearable sensors as it has been demonstrated in
[69]. In a more general way, the versatility offered by CP-ABE primitives is
used to allow sensors to subscribe to the data feeds published by other sen-
sors. The privileges required to access each particular data are set by the
sensor’s policy, who can vary them depending on the context. This allows
for a flexible, scalable, and highly versatile architecture where services can be
dynamically composed by subscribing to the data feeds published by wearable
sensors. Apps and external users (e.g., healthcare staff) can get access to such
data feeds and also reconfigure or request specific data from the sensors pro-
vided that they have sufficient privileges to do so. Finally, the experimental
results confirm that the scheme is suitable for most current sensors, includ-
ing ARM-based platforms. This research led to a publication in the Sensors
journal [137].
C4. An original decentralized attributed based encryption scheme named Decen-
tralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Searchable Encryption is presented
In Chapter 5. This scheme combines encrypted keyword search and ciphertext
policy attribute based encryption. This scheme is suitable for e-Health scenar-
ios, as it allows patients to associate multiple keywords to the encrypted data
collected by a WBAN. The encrypted data could then be stored in a cloud
server together with the encrypted keyword. Subsequently, the healthcare
staff could query the server to run a keyword search and retrieve the desired
data. Decryption, however, would still depend on the attributes that the staff
possesses. Keyword secrecy and Ciphertext secrecy assure the confidentiality
of both the query and the stored data. Finally, the experiments show that
all algorithms used in our system can be implemented on highly constrained
devices such as smartphones or ARM-based architectures. This research is
submitted to an international conference (Asia CCS’16) and it is still under
review.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of the document is composed by 4 chapters distributed as follows:
Chapter 2 presents a new RFID authentication protocol named Fingerprint+
for IoT. This chapter analyses an authentication protocol proposed in the
literature, and after demonstrating that it is not secure enough an improved
version and ISO/IEC 9798-2 and EPC-C1G2 standards compliant is presented.
Chapter 3 introduces two original RFID protocols, an authentication and a secure
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messaging protocols for eHealth environments. This chapter surveys the cur-
rent ISO standards for RFID, analyses the security and privacy of an authen-
tication protocol proposed recently and an improved version following some
NIST recommendations and the ISO/IEC 9798 and 11770 ISO standards is
proposed.
Chapter 4 explores the use of ABE in WBAN architecture for healthcare sce-
narios. In this chapter a complete architecture is proposed where sensors can
either publish new measured data or subscribe to other sensors’ publications.
Contrarily to other recent proposals in this field, in our scheme sensors are able
to encrypt and decrypt messages according to an access policy. Additionally
an authentication protocol is presented to send commands to the sensors and
thus reconfigure their behaviour.
Chapter 5 proposes a complete solution based on a decentralized attribute based
encryption with keyword search in the context of e-Health systems where two
different access policies must be satisfied, one to perform the query and another
one to decrypt the data stored in a public database.
Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions arisen from this PhD Thesis. Finally,
a list of the published papers related to this dissertation is also presented.
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Weaknesses of Fingerprint-based
Mutual Authentication Protocol
2.1 Introduction
The IoT is an emerging paradigm that links Internet with objects (things). The term
things is referred to sensors, actuators, RFID tags or smart phones among others
devices which communicate through the radio channel. In the last years advances
and consolidation of IoT have been the focus of many research work. Most of these
projects point out the need to improve security and privacy for the widespread
use of this technology ([9, 91, 156, 161]). Additionally, new mechanisms for secure
networking have been proposed at [124], [143] and [60]. Readers are urged to consult
[9] in which a survey of IoT is presented. In particular in this chapter we deal with
a novel fingerprint-based RFID authentication protocol presented by Khor et al. in
[93].
RFID is a technology that enables identification from distance ([159]) and is al-
ready used for a large number of different applications, from cards used for building
access or payments with mobile devices ([130]) to applications in sanitary environ-
ments ([23]). RFID is widely used over the world and actually is seen from another
point of view due to its inclusion in the IoT. In Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band,
most of the main manufacturers of IoT proposed an identification based on an Elec-
tronic Product Code (EPC) ([124]), thus each one of the physical objects hold an
RFID tag ([110, 161]).
There are three main components in RFID technology: tags (also known as
transponders), readers (also known as interrogators) and databases. Tags are small
devices with severe limitations of memory, computation and storage resources, which
implies a challenge for supporting security capabilities. Readers are devices with no
computation and memory constraints (in comparison with tags) and communicate
with tags and the database. Finally a database is used to store private information
such as keys and authenticate tags in the system extra information linked with
each tag can be stored too.
The Auto-ID Center was set up in 1999 to develop the EPC and related tech-
nologies that could be used to identify and track products through the global supply
chain. The standard that may be considered as the universal standard for passive
UHF RFID tags is EPC-C1G2 ([53]) (ISO/IEC 18000-6C equivalently).
The IoT is extremely vulnerable to attacks because most of the communications
are wireless, which makes eavesdropping extremely simple. Also, as previously men-
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Perception Layer
Application Layer
Network Layer
Figure 2.1: IOT Architecture
tioned, most of the IoT entities are characterized by its tight constraints in terms of
memory, energy and computing resources. Therefore these devices cannot support
on-board complex security algorithms. Apart from the insecurity of using the radio
channel the major security problems concern to authentication and data integrity.
2.1.1 Contribution and Organization
Recently, in [93] has been proposed a new mutual authentication protocol which
complies with the EPC-C1G2 standard. This chapter brings down the security
claimed by the authors in the original paper. In fact the protocol is vulnerable
to many well-known security vulnerabilities such as full disclosure, impersonation,
traceability, de-synchronization and DoS attacks. It makes Khor et al.’s proposal in-
feasible to be introduced with an adequate security and sufficient privacy protection
level.
This chapter is organized as follows. Background and security threats on IoT are
introduced in Subsection 2.2. In subsection 2.3 we present the Fingerprint-based
Mutual Authentication Protocol. Subsection 2.4 introduces the security weaknesses
that the protocol has and wrecks Khor et al.’s claims while in subsection 2.5 an im-
proved scheme is presented. This new protocol is based on well-established security
standards and its security is formally verified using BAN logic. Finally the chapter
ends with some conclusions in subsection 2.6.
2.2 Background and Security Threats
The architecture of an IoT solution is well-established and divided into three different
layers (perception, application and network) as can be seen in Figure 2.1.
The perception layer is mainly composed of sensors and actuators, in other words
in this layer is where things live. Its function is to identify objects, gather informa-
tion and interact with the environment.
The application layer is where all logical and software applications live. Databases,
social networks, authentication servers, service management or billing functionali-
ties are part of this layer. In other words, this layer constitutes a set of intelligent
software application which are applied to the IoT technology to create smart objects.
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The network layer is in charge of the information transmission obtained from
the perception layer to the application layer. Nowadays the most common way
of communication protocols used in IoT are Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) (in its
last version which has been optimized for high constraints devices), Ultra-WideBand
(UWB), RFID, NFC, IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoW-
PAN) and Zigbee standards. Despite having widely used in the research community
and in real applications, these standards were not designed from the security and
privacy point of view and thus several efforts have been done to secure both data
and communications links from the adversaries.
All these technologies are the most common communication systems used to share
information between smart things, and external devices. Nevertheless all of them
have some characteristics which make them more suitable for some situations than
others in terms of range of communications, transmission speed (bps) or the band-
width they operate. To know more about these wireless technologies two reviews
have been published in [15, 179].
The main form of barcode-type RFID device is given by the known EPC standard
where four different types of tags are defined: 1) EPC-C1G2 [52], which is the most
popular standard for passive RFID tags; 2) Class-2 is a light improvement of EPC-
C1G2 where additional memory and authenticated access control are included; 3)
Class-3 are known as semi-passive tags and they have a power source to help them
with powering the RFID tag when responding to the reader and to provide power to
the internal memory; 4) Class-4 are the active tags. They can establish connections
by themselves and provide power to the internal memory [136].
Readers are devices with no computation and memory constraints (in comparison
with tags) and are the proxy between tags and the databases where the private
information is stored and used for recognizing tags (authentication protocols).
As a negative point, RFID tags always respond to reader interrogation while
bearers do not have any alert about that communication. Taking that promiscuity
into account and the few resources that passive tags have destined to security and
privacy issues, guaranteeing the data confidentiality and privacy is one of the main
open problems that this technology has [11, 86].
In the last years several classification proposals about security threats in RFID
and IoT have appeared in the literature ([11, 92, 98, 115, 117]). We pay particular
attention to those done in [117] and [11]. In the first one, authors proposed a
classification based on four different RFID layers: strategic, application, network-
transport and physical. The attacks were classified basing on the layer where the
attack could be conducted, and then the authors proposed possible solutions to
combat these ones. Some years later, [11] proposed four main attacks categories
that are based on the attack purpose. More precisely he distinguished between
impersonation, DoS, information leakage and traceability. Impersonation is a kind
of attack in which an adversary is authenticated as another entity without being
authorized. For instance, this can be done by replaying messages or tampering the
device for acquiring secret information. In a DoS attack the adversary prevents the
normal operation of the protocol. This can be achieved by physical manipulation of
the channel (jamming) or rendering entities to an unsynchronized state to mention
a few examples. Privacy is the main concern of RFID system, which involves data
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and localization. Information leakage occurs when private information (data) is
disclosed by an adversary. Traceability (localization) is possible when the adversary
can link a tag with its responses the tag holder can be tracked. Therefore the tag
answer must be changed with each session to avoid traceability attacks moreover
correlation between answers has to be negligible.
As shown in [131], the security level of EPC standard is very low or even non-
existent. Aiming to increase the security level offered by this standard many pro-
posals ([39, 45, 173, 166]) have been published in the last years, but unfortunately
cryptanalysis were published ([72, 90, 132, 177]) in the ensuing months. In this
chapter we show how [93] suffers the same fate as previous proposals. That is, this
work does not guaranteed the claimed security properties.
2.3 Fingerprint-based Mutual Authentication Pro-
tocol
In this section, we show briefly how the authentication protocol proposed by [93]
works (see the original paper for details). This protocol was designed conforming
to EPC-C1G2 ([53]) and the authors assume that the channel between reader and
a back-end server is secure meanwhile between reader and tag is insecure. In fact,
this work is marked in the literature ([14, 43, 106, 183]) as a protocol to be followed
because of its security and the way it conforms the EPC standard. The definitions of
notation used by authors are shown in Table 2.1. The protocol, sketched in Figure
2.2, consists of two main phases: initialization and authentication phase.
2.3.1 Initialization phase
In this first phase, a back-end server stores five values of each tag (EPCT , FP,
DATA, PRNG and Ki) indexed by [CRC(EPCT ‖FP)] ⊕ Ki. On the other hand,
each tag stores three values (Ki, EPCT and FP) all of them required to perform
authentication.
2.3.2 Authentication phase
In authentication phase, the reader sends a Request message to the tag. Then,
that tag computes M1 = CRC(EPCT ‖FP ) and encrypts M1 performing a XOR
operation between CRC(EPCT ‖FP ) and the session key Ki: Ck (M1) = [CRC
(EPCT ‖ FP )] ⊕ Ki. After that, the encrypted message is sent back to the reader
and forwarded to the back-end server.
In the server, the authentication of the message is verified. If the decrypted
message M1 does not match with any of the records that the database has, an error
message is sent back to the reader. Otherwise, if the message matches a database’s
record, then the authentication of the tag is successful. At this point, the back-end
server generates a temporary key Ks and the tag generates a new temporary key
Kt. Finally, the server computes a new message M2 and sends it back to the tag:
M2 = CRC(EPCT ‖FP )⊕Ks.
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Notation Interpretation
EPCT Tag’s EPC
FP Fingerprint
DATA Tag Information
CRC() 16-bits Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC)
PRNG 16-bits Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG)
Ki Current session key
Ki+1 New session key
Kt Tag’s temporary key
Ks Server’s temporary key
⊕ Bit-wise exclusive OR operation.
‖ Concatenation
Ck Cipher
Dk Decipher
P /MSG1 P receives MSG1
P | ∼MSG1 P sends MSG1
#(X) X is fresh
P | ≡ #(MSG1) P believes the freshness of MSG1
{X}K Message X is encrypted with the key of K
P | ≡ P K←→ Q P believes the secret K is shared between P and Q
P1 : P |≡P
K←→Q,P/{X}K
P |≡Q|∼X The message meaning rule of BAN logic that means if
P believes that it shares a secret key K with Q and if
P receives a message X encrypted with K, then P is
entitled to believe that Q once said X. In this chapter
we called this rule P1
P2 : P |≡Q∼{X,Y }
P |≡Q|∼{X} This is one rule of BAN logic that means if P believes
Q has sent {X, Y } then P is entitled to believe that Q
has sent X. In this chapter we called this rule P2
Table 2.1: Notation used in the Fingerprint-Based Mutual Authentication Protocol
This phase concludes when the tag receives M2 message from the reader. The
tag computes Mt message (Mt = CRC(EPCT ‖FP )⊕Kt) for verifying the authen-
tication of the back-end server. If M2 and Mt are equal, the tag updates its session
key Ki by Ki+1 = PNRG(Kt). Otherwise the key is not updated, maintaining the
current session key Ki+1 = Ki and the tag sends an error message to the back-end
server which keeps the old session key too.
2.4 Weaknesses of Khor et al. Protocol
In this section, we introduce the security and privacy pitfalls of Khor et al.’s protocol.
Our analysis ruins the security claims done by the authors. In Table 2.2, the reader
can see which the claimed security properties are and those which are not satisfied.
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Tag (T ) Reader (R) Database (DB)
Request←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Ck(M1) =
[CRC(EPCT ‖FP)]⊕Ki
Ck(M1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Ck(M1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if [CRC(EPCT ‖FP)]⊕Ki] in
database, then
[CRC(EPCT ‖FP)]⊕Ki]⊕Ki =
Dk[Ck(M1)],
else, send error message to R
Kt = PRNG(Ki) if Dk[Ck(M1)] 6= [CRC(EPCT ‖FP)]
Mt = [CRC(EPCT ‖FP)]⊕Kt then send error message to R
else:
PRNG(Ki) = Ks
[CRC(EPCT ‖FP)]⊕Ks = M2
PRNG(Ks) = Ki+1
Store new index in dabatase:
[CRC(EPCT ‖FP)]⊕Ki+1
M2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
M2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
if Mt 6= M2 send error message
else: Ki+1 = PRNG(Ks)
Figure 2.2: Fingerprint-Based Mutual Authentication Protocol [93].
Protocol Replay DoS Cloning Forward EPC
Attack Attack Attack Attack Compliant
Khor et al. © © © © ©
Our Attack x x x x ©
Notation: ©: Satisfied x: Vulnerable
Table 2.2: Security Properties
2.4.1 Full Disclosure Attack
In the fingerprint protocol, and adversary A can eavesdrop all messages transmitted
over the insecure radio channel and exploit the fact that the PRNG outputs 16-
bit values to be compliant with EPC-C1G2 standard. Taking advantage of this,
the private information stored on tags and the server can be compromised. The
particular steps of the proposed attack are described below:
1. A eavesdrops one session of the authentication protocol and picks the messages
Ck(M1) and M2 off the radio channel:
Ck(M1) = [CRC(EPCT ⊕ FP )]⊕Ki (2.1)
M2 = [CRC(EPCT ⊕ FP )]⊕Ks (2.2)
where
Ks = PRNG(Ki) (2.3)
2. Taken into account that the length of CRC is 16 bits, then A executes a loop
from i = 0 to i = 216 − 1 doing the next computations and checks:
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• The value of CRC(EPCT ⊕ FP ) is replaced to i. Then K̂i and M̂2 are
calculated:
K̂i = Ck(M1)⊕ i (2.4)
M̂2 = i⊕ PNRG(K̂i) (2.5)
• At this point, if M̂2 is equal to M2, then i and K̂i are returned. Both
values are respectively CRC(EPCT ⊕ FP ) and Ki:
CRC(EPCT ⊕ FP ) = i (2.6)
Ki = K̂i (2.7)
Therefore the adversary is able to compromise the private information that the
protocol attempts to protect. The probability of success of the given attack is one
with a complexity of eavesdropping one session and on-average 215 off-line evaluation
of PRNG and some XOR computations.
In the just presented attack, we assume that the adversary can eavesdrop on both
forward channel (reader-to-tag) and backward channel (tag-to-reader). Nevertheless,
we can assume a much more restrictive condition and consider that A eavesdrops
only on the forward-channel this is the more restrictive scenario possible taken
into account that the radio channel is used. Similarly to the previous attack, A can
disclose private information by eavesdropping on two consecutive protocol sessions
and doing some computations. First, A captures M2 values:
M2(m) = [CRC(EPCT ⊕ FP )]⊕Ks (2.8)
M2(m+ 1) = [CRC(EPCT ⊕ FP )]⊕K ′s (2.9)
where
K ′s = PRNG(Ki+1) = PRNG2(Ks) (2.10)
As we previously showed, A executes an off-line search from i = 0 to i = 216 − 1
while she does the following computations until a match is found:
C = M2(m)⊕M2 (2.11)
C
?= i⊕ PRNG2(i) (2.12)
Finally, A reveals the session key (Ks = i) and the identifier (CRC(EPCT ⊕FP ) =
M2(m) ⊕ i) of the target tag. The probability of being successful is one with a
complexity of eavesdropping two consecutive sessions and performing on-average
215 off-line evaluations of PRNG function and some XOR computations.
Although the two presented attacks ruin all security objectives of Khor et al.’s
protocol, we use other strategies against the protocol aiming to show additional
weak points of this protocol.
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2.4.2 Tag Impersonation
Relay attack is a kind of physical attack where an adversary A acts as a man-in-
the-middle. This attack is as easy as place an illegitimate device between an honest
RFID tag and a reader. With this new device, A is able to intercept, copy, and
modify any of messages transmitted between the legitimate tag and reader. Both
mentioned devices are fooled into thinking that they are communicating directly
with each other when they really are not ([117]).
Replay attack is a kind of multilayer attack where the adversary A copies valid
replies of the communication channel and broadcasts them at a later time to one or
more participants in order to get some benefit ([117]).
The authors claim that replay attacks are prevented due to the value transmitted
for each session is different. Nevertheless, A can exploit the fact that the tag only
updates its secret key after a successful authentication. More precisely, the attack
is divided into two phases:
1. Relay Attack. Let assume A acts as a man-in-the-middle and an authen-
tication session is executed. A copies Ck(M1) value and forwards it to the
reader-server. Once M2 is received, A alters its content (i.e., flipping one bit)
and sends it to the tag. As consequence of the invalid M2 message, the honest
tag sends and error message and A simply passes it to the reader-server. That
is, there is neither key updating in the tag nor in the server (i.e., Ki+1 = Ki).
2. Replay Attack. Let assume A copies Ck(M1) on a counterfeit tag T̂ . This tag
forwards this value after the reception of a request message. Once the validity
of this message is checked, the server forwards M2 which is received by T̂ . T̂
simulates the incorrect reception of M2 and sends back an error message. The
objective of this last error message preventing the key update mechanism is
that T̂ can pass the server authentication in the next session.
So after executing once the relay-attack (Step 2 Replay Attack), a counterfeit
tag can supplant indefinitely a legitimate tag just by eavesdropping the message
Ck(M1) previously captured and replying an error message. The probability of
success is one and it only requires a man-in-the-middle attack (Step 1 Relay
Attack) during a legitimate authentication session.
2.4.3 De-synchronization and DoS Attacks
De-synchronization attack is a kind of multilayer attack. In the RFID context,
this kind of attack is often combated by storing the old and new values of the
updated variables in the back-end database. Therefore, in a de-synchronization
attack the adversary aims to disrupt the key update leaving the tag and reader in a
desynchronized state and avoiding future tag’s authentication.
In [93] the authors do not use any mechanism for recovering from desynchronized
states. Nevertheless, an adversary can de-synchronize a tag and a reader due to both
entities only stored the current key. Let assume A acts as a man-in-the-middle and
an authentication session is executed:
1. A forwards Ck(M1) to the reader-server. Similarly, it passes M2 message to
the tag.
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2. A simulates the incorrect reception of M2 and sends and error message to the
reader-server.
3. Finally, the tag updates its session key while the back-end server does not
update its session key as consequence of receiving the error message:
Ki+1 = PRNG(Kt) (Tag)
Ki+1 = PRNG(Ki) (Reader-Server)
Therefore, in the next authentication (tag identification), the tag and the database
will be desynchronized because both have different keys which makes infeasible fu-
ture authentications of that tag. The probability of success is one and it only requires
a man-in-the-middle attack passing messages and sending an error message during
a legitimate authentication session.
2.4.4 Traceability Attack
Privacy (data and location) is one of the most important risk linked to RFID technol-
ogy. Traceability attacks can be done even if a tag only transmits a static identifier.
If a link can be established by A between the tag and her holder then that person
is going to be tracked wherever she goes. For that link it is not necessary to get the
entire tag’s ID, only with some constant value is enough to track a tag.
We follow the untraceability model proposed by Juels and Weis and later formal-
ized by Phan ([44, 87]). A performs the following steps:
Phase 1 (Learning) A sends an Execute(R, T , i) query. This phase models a
passive attacker. A eavesdrops on the channel at the i-th session, and gets
read access to the exchanged messages between R and T . More precisely, A
acquires the encrypted message sent by T :
Z1 = Ck(M1)T0 = [CRC(EPCT0 ⊕ FPT0)]⊕KT0i } (2.13)
Then, A sends a Send(T , R, i, M ′2) query. This model an active attack (relay
attack) by allowing the adversary A to impersonate R in protocol session i-th,
and send a M ′2 message to T . That is, the adversary receives M2 from the
reader, alters randomly its content (e.g., flipping one bit) and sends M ′2 to T .
As consequence that M ′2 is incorrect, the tag sends an error message to the
server. Therefore, the tag and server do not update its session keys (see Step
1 in subsection 2.4.2):
Ki+1 = Ki (Tag) (2.14)
Ki+1 = Ki (Reader-Server)
Phase 2 (Challenge) A chooses two fresh tags whose associated identifiers are
the tuple {EPCT0 , FPT0} and {EPCT1 , FPT1} respectively. When this query is
invoked in session i + 1-th, a random bit is generated b ∈ {0, 1}. As result,
Ck(M1)Tb ciphered token is given depending on the chosen random bit:
Z2 =
{
Ck(M1)T0 = [CRC(EPCT0 ⊕ FPT0)]⊕KT0i , if b = 0
Ck(M1)T1 = [CRC(EPCT1 ⊕ FPT1)]⊕KT1i+1, if b = 1
(2.15)
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Phase 3 (Guessing) A outputs a bit d (d ∈ {0, 1}) as her guess of the value b. In
particular, we propose the following simple decision rule to obtain value d:
d =
{
0 if Z1 == Z2
1 if Z1 6= Z2 (2.16)
Summarizing, we can track tags exploiting the fact that we can deceive tag and
server to use the same (constant) key permanently. On the other hand, the protocol
does not use any random number to guarantee the freshness of the messages linked
to each session. Formally and according to [44] and [87], the advantage of A in
distinguishing whether the adversary interacts with T0 or T1 is:
AdvUNTA (t, 1) = |Pr[d == b]−
1
2 | = |1−
1
2 | =
1
2 (2.17)
So the advantage is maximum and an adversary tracks a tag meeting with success
100% of her attempts.
2.5 Improved protocol: Fingerprint+
In this section we present an improved version of the protocol analysed in the previ-
ous sections. To avoid security pitfalls the proposed scheme is based on well-known
security standards and tailored to the particular features of an EPC friendly au-
thentication protocol. On one hand the protocol conforms the requirements of the
EPC-C1G2 standard and tags only support a PRNG and bitwise operations for
security purposes. Since the security-level of the protocol resides on the PRNG
function, we recommend the usage of an output length of at least 64 bits note
that NIST recommendation is even more restrictive [1]. On the other hand, and
instead of designing a protocol from scratch, our proposed protocol is highly in-
spired on ISO/IEC 9798 Part 2. In this regulation four protocols are specified to
provide entity authentication and two other ones provide also key establishment.
More precisely, Fingerprint+ protocol is based on the ISO/IEC 9798-2 three-pass
mutual authentication scheme.
In Figure 2.3 we sketch the messages exchanged between the tag and the back-end
server. In the initialization phase the server stores four values of each tag (EPCT ,
FP , DATA, Ki). Correspondingly the tag stores three values (EPCT , FP , Ki),
which are required for the authentication process. In the authentication phase the
reader generates a random number NR and sends this value together a request mes-
sage to the tag. Once the request is received, the tag generates two random numbers,
named in the scheme as the session nonce NS and tag nonce NT . Then, the nonces,
an anonymous identifier (AI = PRNG(NS, NT ,EPC,FP )) and an authentication
token (ATT = PRNG(Ki, NS, NR)) are sent back to the reader and forwarded to the
server. At the server side, the tag is firstly identified by the anonymous identifier
(pseudonym) and then the authentication token is verified. If any of the tags belong-
ing to the tag population managed by the server is identified or the authentication
process fails, an error message is sent back to the reader. Otherwise, the tag is cor-
rectly identified and successfully authenticated. At this point the server generates
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Tag (T ) Reader (R) Database (DB)
Request NR←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NS,NT
AI =
PRNG(NS,NT ,EPCT ,FP)
ATT = PRNG(Ki,NS,NR)
NS ,AI ,ATT NT−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NS ,AI ,ATT ,NT NR−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A′I = PRNG(NS,NT ,EPCT ,FP)
if A′I 6= AI or A′I /∈ database → Error
else {
a′T = PRNG(Ki,NS,NR)
if a′T 6= ATT → Error
else: ATR = PRNG(Ki,NR,NT ,NS)
}
ATR←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
ATR←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
A′TR = PRNG(Ki,NR,NT ,NS)
if A′TR == ATR → Authenticated
else: → Error
Figure 2.3: Fingerprint+ Mutual Authentication Protocol
an authentication token PRNG(Ki, NR, NT , NS) and forwards it to the tag through
the reader. The tag computes a local version of this token and compares it with the
received one. If both are equal, the mutual authentication concludes successfully. If
not, the tag sends back an error message to the server.
The security of the proposed protocol resides on the security of a well-known and
internationally recognized standard. In particular the security of ISO/IEC 9798-2
three pass mutual authentication has been deeply scrutinized and no-attacks are
known. Fingerprint+ has been designed conforming this standard in order to inherit
its security properties. In relation to its predecessor, which is not based in any
security standard, we have overcome all of its security deficiencies. We have avoided
the use of CRCs for security purposes since this sort of functions are linear. Our
scheme is based on the usage of a PRNG other primitives could have been used but
the EPC standard sets this restriction. To guarantee the freshness of the messages
and combat replay attacks three nonces are involved in each session and both entities
generate at least one of them. On the other hand, our protocol does not need of
a key updating scheme as stated in ISO 9798-2 standard and this fact discards de-
synchronization attacks. Finally we have guaranteed the privacy of the identifiers
(EPC and FP ) by the usage of pseudonyms.
2.5.1 Performance Analysis
In our protocol we have introduced two slight changes (i.e., the use of a PRNG
function and pseudonyms) in comparison to the original protocol [93]. The rest of
the protocol (e.g., protocol steps) is preserved without modifications in order to
guarantee the same performance as the original one and to keep in compliance with
the EPC standard. In addition we have analysed the performance of our proposal in
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terms of computational and communication costs, and storage requirements, which
are the common properties evaluated in other proposals. The details are given below:
• Computational cost: Fingerprint+ only requires simple PRNG calculations.
Computational cost is negligible on both reader and server side. On tags these
operations are very low-cost and can be efficiently implemented on-board of
EPC tag’s hardware even with 96-bits length which is the length commonly
assumed on EPC standard [53].
• Storage requirements: Each tag stores two static identifiers (EPC and
FP ) and the key Ki. Furthermore three random numbers are used in the
authentication phase: NS, NT , NR. As said before, a 96-bit length is assumed
for all elements in accordance with EPC standard [53]. Because EPC, FP and
Ki are static values, these could be stored in ROM (96 × 3 = 288 bits). The
remaining values (96× 3 = 288 bits) are stored in the rewritable memory.
• Communication cost: In the communication phase, 6 messages and a “Re-
quest” message are sent over the channel (Reader-Tag) in order to authenticate
mutually both parties. Considering 2 bytes for the “Request” message, a total
amount of 74 bytes are passed over the channel.
2.5.2 Security Analysis of Improved Protocol: Fingerprint+
There are two main ways to prove the security of cryptographic authentication pro-
tocols: informal and formal methods. An informal method of security correctness
proof of a cryptographic protocol relays on the heuristic opinions by security experts
to draw a conclusion. On the other hand, a formal method relies on mathematical
rules and frameworks. In this section we first show that the advantage of any ad-
versary to mount an attack against Fingerprint+ is negligible, see Theorem 1. Next,
we formally show that Fingerprint+ is immune against the attacks presented in this
chapter and also against other known active and passive attacks. Therefore we can
claim that our improved protocol offers a higher security level than its predecessors.
Theorem 1. Assuming that for each fresh query, the used PRNG : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n returns a uniformly distributed random value within its range, the adversary’s
advantage to mount a successful attack after q sessions of the Fingerprint+’s protocol,
is upper bounded by 3q22n .
Proof. We first clarify that we only consider non trivial adversaries that need to
like transferred values over the protocol or to output a message to be accepted by a
party of the protocol. Hence, we rule out any adversary who does not analyse the
details of the transferred messages, e.g., an adversary who just blocks the transferred
messages.
Public messages in a given session of Fingerprint+ are as below:
20
2. Weaknesses of Fingerprint-based Mutual Authentication Protocol
M1 : Ri → Ti :Request,NR
M2 : Ti → Ri :NS, PRNG(NS, NT ,EPCTi , FP ),
PRNG(Ki, NS, NR), NT
M3 : Ri → S :NS, NR, NT ,
PRNG(NS, NT ,EPCTi , FP ), PRNG(Ki, NS, NR)
M4 : S → Ri :PRNG(Ki, NR, NT , NS)
M5 : Ri → Ti :PRNG(Ki, NR, NT , NS)
Hence, we can consider three different following categorization for adversaries
according to its attack:
1. Passive adversaries who eavesdrop public messages - Such an adversary has no
control over NR, NS and NT . Hence, for such an adversary PRNG(NS, NT ,
EPCTi , FP ), PRNG(Ki,NS,NR) and PRNG(Ki,NR,NT ,NS) are uniformly
randomized for any session, as long as both the reader and the tag have not
used a repeated set of random values. Since any message is at leased ran-
domized by two random values, the adversary’s advantage to link any two
transferred messages is upper bounded by 122n and the adversary’s success
probability after q sessions is upper bounded by 3q222n
2. Active adversaries who control public messages from the reader to the tag -
Such an adversary can control NR, however NS and NT are out of her control.
Hence, for such an adversary PRNG(NS, NT ,EPCTi , FP ), PRNG(Ki, NS, NR)
and PRNG(Ki, NR, NT , NS) are uniformly randomized for any session, as long
as the tag has not used a repeated random value. Since any message is at
leased randomized by a random value generated by the tag (message which
is not under adversary’s control), the adversary’s advantage to link any two
transferred messages or to output a modified message which is accepted by the
tag is upper bounded by 12n . Hence, the adversary’s success probability after
q sessions is upper bounded by 3q22n .
3. Active adversaries who control public message from the tag to the reader - Such
an adversary can control NS and NT , however NR is out of her control. Hence,
for such an adversary PRNG(NS, NT ,EPCTi , FP ), PRNG(Ki, NS, NR) and
PRNG(Ki, NR, NT , NS) are uniformly randomized for any session, as long
as the reader has not used the same NR in two different sessions. Since any
message is randomized byNR (message which is not under adversary’s control),
the adversary’s advantage to link any two transferred messages or to output
a modified message which is accepted by the reader is upper bounded by 12n .
Hence, the adversary’s success probability after q sessions is upper bounded
by 3q22n .
Therefore we can conclude that for any active or passive adversary, that needs
either to link messages or to output a correct message, the success probability after q
attempt is upper bounded by 3q22n . On the other hand, in any conventional attack for
RFID systems, e.g., tag/reader impersonation and traceability, the adversary should
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either links transferred messages in different sessions or outputs a valid message that
is accepted by a protocol party. Thus the adversary’s advantage to mount an attack
against Fingerprint+ is upper bounded by 3q22n .
It must be noted that an adversary could change a message and send it to the
reader/tag to be authenticated by that party. However, for example if the adversary
modifies PRNG(Ki, NR, NT , NS) in the last step to the tag to any desired value,
the value will be authenticated by the tag with the probability of 12n , which is far
lower than the considered advantage for the adversary. Almost a similar argument
can be presented for an adversary who changes the messages to the reader. Hence,
3q2
2n is the upper bound of the adversary’s advantage to mount an attack.
2.5.2.1 Formal Security Analysis
A formal method is a technique to analyse the security of a cryptographic proto-
col which describes the protocol properties based on mathematics and logic. That
is, the target protocol and its features are modelled based on algebra and logic.
Several logic tools exist to prove the security correctness of a cryptographic au-
thentication protocol, e.g., BAN logic [35], GNY logic [65], AVISPA tool [10] and
Proverif tool [26].
In this chapter, we use BAN logic to prove the security correctness of Fingerprint+.
We formally show that after one run of Fingerprint+ the tag, the reader and the
server believe the received messages are from the expected sender and these messages
are fresh. Hence, they can be authenticated by each other properly.
To prove the security of a protocol formally with BAN logic the following four
steps [35] should be followed:
• The messages and the actions of the protocol parties should be represented by
mathematical relations.
• The messages and the actions of the protocol parties should be converted
into BAN logic formulas and dropping the plain text messages from protocol
messages. In this step, the resulting protocol messages are called idealized
messages.
• The protocol initial assumptions and security goals should be explained as
BAN logic formulas.
• Finally the protocol security goals should be deduced. In this step, using BAN
logic rules it is evaluated whether protocol security goals are satisfied or not.
In bellow, Ri, Ti and S symbolize the reader, the tag and the database server
respectively. We also show BAN logic notations and rules which are used in our
proof in Table 2.1.
Mathematical stating the protocol’s messages
At the first step we mathematically, similar to Theorem 1, represent the messages
of Fingerprint+ as below:
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M1 : Ri → Ti :Request,NR
M2 : Ti → Ri :NS, PRNG(NS, NT ,EPCTi , FP ),
PRNG(Ki, NS, NR), NT
M3 : Ri → S :NS, NR, NT ,
PRNG(NS, NT ,EPCTi , FP ), PRNG(Ki, NS, NR)
M4 : S → Ri :PRNG(Ki, NR, NT , NS)
M5 : Ri → Ti :PRNG(Ki, NR, NT , NS)
Converting the protocol messages into idealized form based on BAN
logic formulas
In this stage, we transform each Fingerprint+ś message into an idealized message,
i.e., plaintexts are omitted from protocol messages and only encrypted message
contents are relevant to this step. We also use BAN logic notations for representing
these idealized messages as follows:
IM1 :Ri / {NS, NT , FP}EPCTi
IM2 :Ri / {NS, NR}Ki
IM3 :S / {NS, NT , FP}EPCTi
IM4 :S / {NS, NR}Ki
IM5 :Ri / {NR, NT , NS}Ki
IM6 :Ti / {NR, NT , NS}Ki
Representing initial assumptions and security goals as BAN logic for-
mulas
The explicit assumptions of our proposed protocol are shown below:
A1 :Ti| ≡ S Ki←→ Ti
A2 :S| ≡ Ti Ki←→ S
A3 :Ti| ≡ S
EPCTi←→ Ti
A4 :S| ≡ Ti
EPCTi←→ S
A5 :Ti| ≡ S FP←→ Ti
A6 :S| ≡ Ti FP←→ S
A7 :Ti| ≡ #(NS)
A8 :Ti| ≡ #(NT )
A9 :Ri| ≡ #(NR)
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Assumptions A1 to A6 are related to secrets which are shared between protocol’s
parties. Assumptions A7 to A9 are linked with freshness of random numbers which
are generated by the tag and the reader, respectively.
The goals of our Fingerprint+ are as below:
G1 : S| ≡ Ti| ∼ FP
G2 : S| ≡ Ti| ∼ NS
G3 : Ti| ≡ S| ∼ NR
G1 means that the server believes the tag Ti has sent fingerprint FP . This
indicates that the adversary has not changed this fingerprint, which was generated
by the tag and sent through the reader to the server. Therefore, the adversary cannot
apply any attack on the protocol that requires any change on this fingerprint.
G2 means that the server believes the tag has sent NS. This indicates that
the adversary has not changed this data which was generated by the tag and sent
through the reader to the server.
G3 means that the tag believes the server has sent NR. This indicates that the
adversary has not changed this data which was generated by the reader and sent to
the tag.
Deducing the protocol security goals
BAN logic rules are expressed as fractional forms [35] which if its numerator
expressions are correct then it can be concluded that the denominator expressions
are also correct. In this step we combine idealized messages and the assumptions to
construct numerator expressions of BAN logic rules. These numerators are used to
prove the correctness of the denominator expressions that are corresponding to the
security goals. We show these deductions as below:
If we consider IM3 idealized message, i.e., S / {NS, NT , FP}EPCTi with A4 as-
sumption, i.e., S| ≡ Ti
EPCTi←→ S, it can be easily seen the numerator of BAN logic P1
rule, i.e., P |≡P
K←→Q,P/{X}K
P |≡Q|∼X is constructed and thus we can deduce that the denomi-
nator is also correct. It can be seen as follows:
D1 : IM3, A4, P1⇒ S| ≡ Ti| ∼ {NS, NT , FP}
Similarly if we consider the previous results, i.e., D1 : S| ≡ Ti| ∼ {NS,NT ,FP},
it can be easily seen the numerator of BAN logic P2 : P |≡Q∼{X,Y }
P |≡Q|∼{X} rule is constructed
and thus we can deduce the denominator is also correct as shown below:
D2 : D1, P2⇒ S| ≡ Ti| ∼ FP
Next, consider IM4 idealized message, i.e., S / {NS, NR}Ki with A2 assumption,
i.e.,S| ≡ Ti Ki←→ S, it can be easily seen the numerator of BAN logic P1 rule, i.e.,
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P |≡P K←→Q,P/{X}K
P |≡Q|∼X is constructed and thus we can deduce the denominator is also
correct. It can be seen as follows:
D3 : IM4, A2, P1⇒ S| ≡ Ti| ∼ {NS, NR}
In addition, if we consider the previous results, i.e., D3 : S| ≡ Ti| ∼ {NS,NR}, it
can be easily seen the numerator of BAN logic P2 : P |≡Q∼{X,Y }
P |≡Q|∼{X} rule is constructed
and thus we can deduce the denominator is also correct as shown below:
D4 : D3, P2⇒ S| ≡ Ti| ∼ NS
Now, if we consider IM6 idealized message, i.e., Ti / {NR,NT ,NS}Ki with A1
assumption, i.e., Ti| ≡ S Ki←→ Ti, it can be easily seen the numerator of BAN logic
P1 rule, i.e., P |≡P
K←→Q,P/{X}K
P |≡Q|∼X is constructed and thus we can deduce the denominator
is also correct. It can be seen as follows:
D5 : IM6, A1, P1⇒ Ti| ≡ S| ∼ {NR, NT , NS}
If we consider D5 : Ti| ≡ S| ∼ {NR, NT , NS}, it can be easily seen the numerator
of BAN logic P2 : P |≡Q∼{X,Y }
P |≡Q|∼{X} rule is constructed and thus we can deduce the
denominator is also correct as shown below:
D6 : D5, P2⇒ Ti| ≡ S| ∼ NR
Finally, it can be seen that D2 == G1, D4 == G2 and D6 == G3 and then our
proposed protocol security goals G1, G2 and G3 are satisfied.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we show that fingerprint-based authentication protocol proposed
in [93] by Jing Huey Khor et al. is completely insecure. An attacker, equipped
with a domestic PC, can execute a full disclosure attack in only a few minutes.
On the other hand, there is not any source of freshness in any of the messages of
the protocol, strategy that is often needed to combat replay attacks. Furthermore,
de-synchronization of the protocol is simple because the server and the tag only
keep the current session key. In fact, there is not any mechanism to recover from
a previous state when an incorrect message is received due to errors in the channel
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or manipulations by an adversary. Therefore, this chapter ruins all the security
objectives that the protocol aims to offer.
To avoid that protocols are almost immediately cryptanalysed after its proposal,
the use of well-known security approaches is recommended. In our particular case
we present Fingerprint+ protocol and then formally prove its security. The im-
proved protocol is based on ISO/IEC 9798-2 and EPC-C1G2 standard equivalently
ISO/IEC 18000-6C.
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Two RFID standard-based
security protocols for healthcare
environments
3.1 Introduction
RFID is a technology for remote identification using radio waves. An RFID system is
composed of tags, readers and a database for access and authentication management
procedures. There are three different types of tags according to their source of
power. Active tags the most expensive are equipped with a battery and can start
a connection with a reader by themselves. Passive tags are the cheapest ones, do not
have any on-board source of power and harvest energy from the reader signal. Semi-
passive tags lie somewhere in between both classes, as they use their own battery for
computations but collect energy from the reader signal for communication purposes.
Tying up RFID technology and healthcare environments has been the focus of
much research recently due to the potential benefits that this technology could offer,
both in terms of savings in operational costs and as enablers of novel applications
[152, 172]. As shown in Table 3.1, the range of healthcare problems where RFID
could be successfully applied is significant, in some cases with important benefits.
For example, the theft of newborn children is a worldwide problem that has recently
made the news. It is claimed that in the last 50 years more than 300,000 newborns
were abducted in Spain [112]. Similar cases have been reported in Australia [51],
while in the US the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children has published
some statistics about this alarming problem [120]. To address this problem, several
hospitals in different countries have adopted a new and controversial RFID-based
solution [13, 108, 165].
Security and privacy concerns associated with the widespread adoption of RFID
systems in healthcare environments have been a major deterrent for the penetration
of this technology in key application areas. In the last five years, many works
have addressed some of these issues by proposing different schemes that facilitate a
secure execution of certain healthcare functions. The majority of such schemes have
been soon proved insecure despite the claims made in their original proposals. For
example, in 2009 Huang and Ku proposed a grouping proof to guarantee medication
safety of inpatients [76]. Soon after it was shown that the scheme was vulnerable
to DoS and replay attacks [46]. Chien et al. suggested a more secure version, but
unfortunately an adversary can still conduct impersonation and replay attacks with
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Patient Traceability [119, 170]
Asset Management [126, 140]
Medication Administration [8, 174]
Handling Errors [37, 129]
Ownership Transfer Procedures [169, 181]
Efficiency Management [129, 171]
Cost Savings [33, 170]
Table 3.1: Some healthcare applications of RFID technology.
a high success probability [133]. In this direction, the IS-RFID system proposed
in [133] seems an interesting proposal to combat medication errors, but the system
does not guarantee that the proofs cannot be manipulated by the hospital [174],
which can be crucial in case of dispute due to malpractice. In 2012, Chen et al. [40]
proposed a novel RFID-based tamper-resistant prescription access control protocol
for different authorized readers. Yet again, the protocol was proved to suffer from
impersonation, traceability and de-synchronization attacks [144].
3.1.1 Contributions and Organization
Wu et al. have recently proposed a new RFID authentication protocol for healthcare
environments [164]. Apart from guaranteeing some essential security properties, the
protocol claims to solve the trade-off between location privacy and scalability in
healthcare environments. A description of Wu et al.’s protocol is provided later in
subsection 3.2. In this subsection, we first show that this protocol is vulnerable
to a traceability attack that allows an adversary to compromise the location pri-
vacy of the tag’s holder (e.g., a patient, doctor or nurse). The detailed description
and analysis of this attack is provided in subsection 3.3. A brief summary of the
ISO/IEC 9798 parts 1 to 6 is presented in subsection 3.4. Subsequently in subsection
3.5 we propose authentication and secure messaging protocols based on established
ISO standard and well-known security recommendations. In particular, we tailor an
entity authentication protocol from ISO/IEC 9798 Part 2 and a secure messaging
protocol from ISO/IEC 11770 Part 2 similar to that used in electronic passports.
In addition, we discuss some implementation aspects and suggest specific primi-
tives based on NIST 800-38A, NIST 800-38B, and NIST 800-108 recommendations.
Finally, subsection 3.6 concludes the chapter by summarizing our main results.
3.2 Wu et al.’s Protocol
Wu et al. introduce in [164] a novel authentication protocol to be used in open
environments such as academic medical centres or metropolitan and local community
hospitals. The authors claim that the proposal solves the trade-off between location
privacy and scalability in healthcare environments. Figure 3.1 shows the main steps
involved in the scheme using the notation provided by Table 3.2.
The protocol consists of two different phases: setup and execution. In the setup
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RFID Tag (T ) RFID Reader (R) Database (DB)
NR = PRNG
Query,NR←−−−−−−−−
NT = PRNG
c1 = KT1NT
c2 = KT2NT ⊕ ID
c3 = h(c1, KT2NR)
c1,c2,c3−−−−−−−−→
c1,c2,c3,NR−−−−−−−−→
c4 = Key2Key−11 × c1,
ID′ = c4 ⊕ c2,
Finds K ′T2 by ID′,
Check c3 = h(c1, K ′T2NR),
c5=h(c4)←−−−−−−−−
c5=h(c4)←−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.1: Wu et al.’s Authentication Protocol [164].
phase, the server generates three d× d binary matrices (Key1, Key2, Key3), where
Key1 is a nonsingular matrix and Key3 is a singular one. After that, the server
generates two matrices for each tag: KT1 = Key1Key3ST and KT2 = Key2Key3ST ,
where ST is a random matrix of size d× d. The execution phase of the protocol is
described below:
Step 1: The reader (R) sends a query signal and a random value NR to the tag.
Step 2: The tag (T ) generates a random value NT and computes c1 = KT1NT ,
c2 = KT2NT ⊕ ID, and c3 = h(c1, KT2NR). Finally, the tag sends c1, c2, and
c3 to the reader.
Step 3: R appends NR to the received messages c1, c2, and c3 and forwards them
to the server.
Step 4: The server computes c4 = Key2Key−11 × c1 and recovers the ID by
computing c4 ⊕ c2. Then, the server checks if the calculated matrix key K ′T2
matches the received c3. To do this, a local version of c3 is computed as c′3 =
h(c1, K ′T2NR). If both are equal the reader authenticates the tag; otherwise
the server informs the reader to restart the communication or simply reject it.
Step 5: The server computes c5 = h(c4) and sends it to the tag.
Step 6: Finally, T checks if c5 is equal to h(K ′T2NT ). If so, the tag believes that
this message comes from a valid reader (reader authentication).
3.3 Location Attack against Wu et al.’s Protocol
In this section, we show that the Wu et al.’s protocol fails to preserve the location
privacy of a tag’s holder. In fact, an adversaryA can execute a successful traceability
attack that requires to eavesdrop only a few authentication sessions. The details of
the proposed attack are given below.
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KT Secret key of tag T
Key Secret key of the server
ID Identification number of the tag
NR,NT Nonces chosen by the reader and the tag, respectively
h(.) A hash function
⊕ Bit-wise exclusive OR operation.
A−1 Inverse of matrix A.
AB Multiplication of matrices A and B
Table 3.2: Notation used in Wu et al.’s protocol [164].
Wu et al. analyse extensively their protocol to prove that the proposed scheme
provides location privacy. They claim that the adversary advantage to trace a given
tag after q queries1 is upper bounded by q22l+1 , where l is the output length of the
hash function used in the protocol. Nevertheless, we show how an active adversary
can efficiently trace any given tag in this protocol with an advantage significantly
higher than that. The presented attack is based on the following observation, which
was missed by the designers:
First Assume that (A)i denotes the i-th column of matrix A. Let X and X ′ be
random binary matrices of size d × d, and Y and Y ′ fixed binary matrices of
size d× r.
1. If (X)i = (X ′)j and Y = Y ′, then (Y ×X)i = (Y ′×X ′)j with probability
1.
2. If (X)i = (X ′)j and Y 6= Y ′, then (Y ×X)j = (Y ′×X ′)j with probability
2−d.
Recall that in Wu et al.’s protocol, we have c1 = KT1NT and c2 = KT2NT ⊕ ID,
where KT1 is a nonsingular matrix. Thus, if (NT )i = (N ′T )j then:
(KT1NT )i = (KT1N ′T )j
and
(KT2NT ⊕ ID)i = (KT2N ′T ⊕ ID)j
Based on the above observation, an adversary A can perform the following steps to
trace a target tag T :
Phase 1 (Learning): A creates a table Tab with N rows and runs N sessions with
the tag T as follows. At each run 1 ≤ j ≤ N :
1. A sends N jR ∈ {0, 1}l to the tag.
2. T generates a random value N jT and computes cj1 = KT1N jT , cj2 = KT2N jT ⊕ID
and cj3 = h(cj1, KT2N
j
R). Finally, T sends cj1, cj2, and cj3 to A (since he is acting
as a reader).
3. A stores cj1 and cj2 in the j-th row of Tab.
Phase 2 (Execution): Given a tag T ’, the adversary proceeds exactly as in the
learning phase, creating a table Tab′ with N ′ columns and running N ′ sessions with
T ’ as follows. At each run 1 ≤ f ≤ N :
1In the location-privacy game used in [164] a query represents the hash query of T or an
anonymous query sent to T .
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1. A sends N fR ∈ {0, 1}l to the tag.
2. T ’ generates a random value N fT and computes cf1 = KT1N fT , cf2 = KT2N fT ⊕ID
and cf3 = h(cf1 , KT2N
f
R). Finally, T ’ sends cf1 , cf2 , and cf3 to A (who, again, is
acting as a reader).
3. A stores cf1 and cf2 in the f -th row of Tab.
Phase 3 (Decision): To decide whether T ’ is the target tag T , the adversary
checks:
• T 6= T ′ if ∃ (cj1, cj2) ∈ Tab and (cf1 , cf2) ∈ Tab′ such that (cj1)m = (cf1)n but
(cj2)m 6= (cf2)n, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ N , 0 ≤ f ≤ N ′ and 0 ≤ m,n ≤ r − 1.
• Otherwise T = T ’.
The total complexity of the given attack is N sessions in the learning phase plus
N ′ sessions in the execution phase. The adversary’s advantage, AdvA, to make the
correct decision in the third phase of the attack is defined as:
AdvA =
∣∣∣Pr[AT =T ′ ⇒ 1]− Pr[AT 6=T ′ ⇒ 1]∣∣∣ (3.1)
In order to determine AdvA, we have to take into account the following consid-
erations:
1. There are N entries in Tab, each of which includes a value for c1 with r
columns. There are, therefore, N × r columns in total. Similarly, there are
N ′ × r columns for the values of c1 in Tab′.
2. For each (cj1)m ∈ Tab and (cf1)n ∈ Tab′ we have (cj1)m = (cf1)n with probability
2−d. Consequently, the expected number of matching columns for c1 in Tab
with those in Tab′ is (N × r)× (N ′ × r)× 2−d.
3. Given that (cj1)m = KT1(N
j
T )m and KT1 is a nonsingular, if (c
j
1)m = (cf1)n and
T =T ’, then with probability 1 we have (N jT )m = (N fT )n and (cj2)m = (cf2)n.
However, if (cj1)m = (cf1)n and T 6= T ′, then with probability 2−d we have
(cj2)m = (cf2)n. Therefore, the probability of incorrectly believing that T = T ’
when in fact T 6= T ′ is given by:
Pr[AT 6=T ′ ⇒ 1] =
(
2−d
)(N×r)×(N ′×r)×2−d
(3.2)
In summary, the adversary’s advantage to successfully trace the target tag is:
AdvA = |Pr[AT =T ′ ⇒ 1]− Pr[AT 6=T ′ ⇒ 1] (3.3)
= 1− (2−d)(N×r)×(N ′×r)×2−d
The probability of success given by (3.3) is considerably high for a sufficient num-
ber of eavesdropped sessions (N and N ′), allowing an attacker to successfully trace
a tag with probability >> 1/2. (Note that the value 1/2 would be the advantage in
the ideal case when location privacy location is guaranteed.) Assume, for instance,
that 256-bit keys are chosen (e.g., by using 16× 16 matrices, i.e., d = 16), and that
random numbers have size 128 bits through 16 × 8 matrices and, therefore, r = 8.
In this case, if the attacker is able to eavesdropped just N = 32 sessions during the
learning phase of the attack, and another N ′ = 32 sessions during the execution
phase, he will succeed with a probability AdvA ≥ 1− 2−16, which is almost equal to
1. Figure 3.2 shows the probability of success of the attack for the most common
values of l = d2 in current RFID tags.
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Alice Bob
B A
{TA,B}Kab−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 3.3: ISO/IEC 9798-2: Unilateral Authentication with Timestamps
Alice Bob
B A
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−
{NB ,B}Kab−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 3.4: ISO/IEC 9798-2: Unilateral Authentication with Nonces
know more about these three types of random numbers we encourage reader to
consult details in [116].
3.4.0.1 ISO/IEC 9798 Part 1
ISO/IEC 9798-1 mainly describes the general model for the entity authentication
mechanisms of all parts of the standard. This part presents definitions and notations,
describes the authentication model and gives some requirements and constraints
which are shared with other parts of the standard. Additionally it has some infor-
mation about how should be used text fields, time variant parameters such as time
stamps, sequence numbers, or random numbers, and finally the use of certificates.
3.4.0.2 ISO/IEC 9798 Part 2
ISO/IEC 9798-2 describes 6 different protocol with the required content of messages
for entity authentication. Four of these protocols are intended to provide entity
authentication without key establishment i.e., without a Trusted Third Party (TTP)
and can be split on whether timestamps (Tx) and a nonce (Nx) is used to freshness.
Additionally, entity authentication can be either unilateral which means that only
one entity is authenticated or bilateral (mutual authentication) which means that
both entities are authenticated by increasing the messages exchanged.
1. Unilateral Authentication with Timestamps - Alice and Bog share a symmetric
key in advance. Alice is authenticated by Bob because Alice introduces the
identifier B ensuring that Alice has knowledge of Bob. This protocol can be
seen in Fig. 3.3.
2. Unilateral Authentication with Nonces - The claimant Alice initiates the com-
munication sending a single message to the verifier Bob who authenticates
Alice. This protocol has the same properties as the one with timestamps.
Once Bob has received the message, {NB, B}Kab is decrypted and thus the
correctness of the identifier B and the nonce NB are checked. This protocol
can be seen in Fig. 3.4.
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Alice Bob
B A
{TA,B}Kab−−−−−−−−−−−−→
{TB ,A}Kab←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.5: ISO/IEC 9798-2: Mutual Authentication with Timestamps
Alice Bob
B A
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−
{NA,NB ,B}Kab−−−−−−−−−−−−→
{NB ,NA}Kab←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.6: ISO/IEC 9798-2: Mutual Authentication with Nonces
3. Mutual Authentication with Timestamps - This protocol is built from two in-
stances of the first one providing mutual authentication between Bob and
Alice. This protocol can be seen in Fig. 3.5.
4. Mutual Authentication with Nonces - This forth protocol is a consequence of
the second protocol with some modifications to allow mutual authentication.
Thus this is achieved by increasing the length of the message (both nonces
are bound) and by introducing an additional message in order to Bob can be
authenticated by Alice. This protocol can be seen in Fig. 3.6.
5. The last two protocols where a TTP takes place, are basically the same as in
the ISO/IEC 11770-2 standard. In these protocols, entities share symmetric
keys with the TTP instead of sharing symmetric keys among themselves. The
symmetric session key Kab shared between Alice and Bob is generated by TTP
and is sent to both Alice and Bob in a digital envelope. After receiving that
message from the TTP, Alice sends a message with this new data to Bob to
be authenticated. In mutual authentication, Bob additionally sends back to
Alice a message after being authenticated and thus Bob can be authenticated
by Alice.
6. Unilateral Authentication with Nonces and TTP - In this protocol, Alice sends
an encrypted message to the TTP which checks its authenticity and finally
the TTP replies by: 1) sending back a nonce to Alice to check that the key
was received and 2) sending a timestamp to Bob to check freshness. Finally
the session key Kab is chosen by Alice. This protocol can be seen in Fig. 3.7.
7. Mutual Authentication with Nonces and TTP - In this final protocol, and
optional handshake is also introduced by Alice. The main difference with the
protocol described above is that in this case, Bob is who chooses the session
key Kab and thus both entities are mutually authenticated. This protocol can
be seen in Fig. 3.8.
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Alice Bob TTP
{NA,B,Kab}Kas−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
{NA,B}Kas ,{TS ,KAB ,A}Kbs←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
{TS ,KAB ,A}Kbs−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 3.7: ISO/IEC 9798-2: Unilateral Authentication with Nonces and TTP
Alice Bob TTP
NA−−−−−−−−→
{NB ,NA,A,Kab}Kbs−−−−−−−−−−−→
{NB ,A}Kbs ,{NA,Kab,B}Kas←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
{NA,Kab,B}Kas←−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.8: ISO/IEC 9798-2: Mutual Authentication with Nonces and TTP
3.4.0.3 ISO/IEC 9798 Part 3
Five protocols are described in the ISO/IEC 9798-3 where two of them are for unilat-
eral authentication and the other three mechanisms are for mutual authentication.
Messages are exchanged between the claimant and the verifier for the verification
of the claimant’s identity in the unilateral authentication or both entities are veri-
fied in the mutual authentication. The standard has some flexibility for some text
fields which may be included or not in the protocol for some security reasons such
as information authentication, add extra redundancy to the signature or to provide
validation among others. Timestamps, counters or random numbers can be added
to provide freshness of the messages.
1. Unilateral Authentication with Timestamps - Alice and Bog share a symmetric
key in advance. This protocol guarantees to Bob that Alice is alive (TA),
as well as providing assurance that Alice is aware of Bob as her peer entity
(SigA(TA, B)). This protocol can be seen in Fig. 3.9.
2. Unilateral Authentication with Nonces - Alice and Bog share a symmetric key
in advance. This protocol is essentially the same as the one described above.
However it has two main differences: 1) timestamps are substituted by nonces;
2) the nonce NA chosen by Alice to ensure that Alice is not signing messages
already chosen by Bob, but this may generate some problems to Alice if the
signature and the key are also used again in other applications. This protocol
can be seen in Fig. 3.10.
3. Mutual Authentication with Timestamps - This protocol is a combination of
two instances of the first one providing thus mutual authentication for both
entities. Note that messages are not dependent and this protocol may be
executed only in one round. This protocol can be seen in Fig. 3.11.
4. Mutual Authentication with Nonces - This forth protocol is an extension of the
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Alice Bob
B A
TA,B,SigA(TA,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 3.9: ISO/IEC 9798-3: Unilateral Authentication with Timestamps
Alice Bob
B A
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NA,NB ,B,SigA(NA,NB ,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 3.10: ISO/IEC 9798-3: Unilateral Authentication with Nonces
second one where timestamps are used. Additionally, mutual authentication is
allowed by sending back a message from Bob to Alice. Note that messages in
this protocol are dependent and cannot be answered in advance. This protocol
can be seen in Fig. 3.11.
5. Parallel Mutual Authentication with Nonces - This last protocol is an improve-
ment of the fifth one allowing authentication in parallel between Alice and Bob.
This could be done due to the exchange of NA and NB as the first part of the
protocol. Note that this operation can be done in parallel and thus the last
two messages can be run in parallel too. This protocol can be seen in Fig.
3.13.
3.4.0.4 ISO/IEC 9798 Part 4
This part of ISO/IEC 9798-4 specifies four entity authentication protocols using
a cryptographic check function. This is particularly interesting when there is no
need to recover the components of the function due to the computational costs.
Additionally, the standard does not specify if messages can or not contain text fields
and the relationship they have. Note that this part, according to the standard, could
be used for key distribution protocols.
The structure is similar to others parts of the standard: first two mechanisms
are concerned with unilateral authentication, while the other two are mechanisms
for mutual authentication. The algorithms proposed can be seen in Fig. 3.14 where
unilateral authentication is used and in Fig. 3.15 where mutual authentication is
implemented. Note that, ISO/IEC 9798-2 is equal to this protocol however a hash
function is used instead of symmetric encryption.
According to this part of the standard, if a time stamp or sequence number
is used, one pass is needed for unilateral authentication and another one more to
achieve mutual authentication. On the other hand, if random numbers are used
instead of timestamps, two passes are needed for unilateral authentication and one
more to achieve mutual authentication.
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Alice Bob
B A
TA,B,SigA(TA,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
TB ,A,SigB(TB ,A)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.11: ISO/IEC 9798-3: Mutual Authentication with Timestamps
Alice Bob
B A
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NA,NB ,B,SigA(NA,NB ,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NB ,NA,A,SigB(NB ,NA,A)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.12: ISO/IEC 9798-3: Mutual Authentication with Nonces
3.4.0.5 ISO/IEC 9798 Part 5
ISO/IEC 9798-5 specifies entity authentication mechanisms using zero-knowledge
techniques. These mechanisms rely on the use of random numbers not only as
challenges, but also as commitments to prevent bad behaviours and cheating. This
can be achieved by allowing a prover to demonstrate knowledge of a secret while no
more information is published. This part can be grouped into five sets according
to the nature of the zero-knowledge techniques. All of them provide unilateral
authentication but only those who are based on asymmetric encryption and elliptic
curves allow both unilateral and mutual authentication:
• Identities.
• Integer factorization.
• Discrete logarithms with respect to numbers that are either prime or compos-
ite.
• Asymmetric encryption.
• Discrete logarithms on elliptic curves (note that these mechanisms are con-
structed according to the zero-knowledge basis, however they are not neces-
sarily zero-knowledge because of the parameter’s choice).
Moreover, according to the type of calculation this part can be classified into
four main groups [79]:
1. Short modular exponentiations. The challenge size needs to be optimized since
it has a proportional impact on workloads.
2. Possibility of a "coupon" strategy for the claimant. A verifier can authenticate
a claimant without computational power. The challenge size has no impact
on workloads.
3. Possibility of a "coupon" strategy for the verifier. A verifier without compu-
tational power can authenticate a claimant. The challenge size has no impact
on workloads.
4. No possibility of a "coupon" strategy.
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Alice Bob
B A
NA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NA,NB ,B,SigA(NA,NB ,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NB ,NA,A,SigB(NB ,NA,A)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.13: ISO/IEC 9798-3: Parallel Mutual Authentication with Nonces
Alice Bob
B A
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NA,hK(NA,NB ,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 3.14: ISO/IEC 9798-4: Unilateral Authentication with Nonces
Well known examples of zero-knowledge protocols which are commonly use as
an extension of this standard are Fiat-Shamir [59], Gillou-Quisquarter [68] and
Schnorr’s [148] identification protocols. Comparison and attacks can be read in
Chapter 10 of [116].
3.4.0.6 ISO/IEC 9798 Part 6
This last part of the standard, ISO/IEC 9798-6, specifies four entity authentication
mechanisms based on manual data transfer between authenticating devices. In this
part, the term entity authentication is completely different from the rest parts of the
standards. Here, both parties check that they share the same data string at the same
execution time of the mechanism instead of verifying the identity each party. This
could be particularly appropriate in some kind of personal area networks or networks
where there is no need for an existing public key infrastructure, shared secret keys or
passwords where, for example two personal devices need to authenticate themselves
to perform some actions. It is worth saying that these mechanisms may also be used
to support key management functions.
As an example of data authentication, MANA certificate is presented in section
6.2.3 of the standard [80]. MANA has two components: a key (K) which is generated
in a random way and a check value (CV ) which is computed from the key and the
data (Data). The protocol can be seen in Fig. 3.16.
For more information all original parts of the standard are in [79, 80, 81, 82, 83].
A recent publication where part 2 is analysed under an automatic tool for analysing
security protocols named AVISPA can be seen in [182]. A depth analysis of ISO/IEC
9798 is done in a technical report in [18] while some improvements over the standard
can be read in [19, 20] and additional references can be read in [12, 32, 116]
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Alice Bob
B A
NB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
NA,hK(NA,NB ,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
hK(NA,NB ,A)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.15: ISO/IEC 9798-4: Mutual Authentication with Nonces
Alice Bob User
Data−−−−−−−−−−−−→
CV = f(Data,K)
CV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(CV,K)←−−−−−−−−−−−−
CV ′ = f(Data,K)
if CV ′ = CV
then Data = OK
Figure 3.16: ISO/IEC 9798-6: MANA certificate
3.5 Standard-based RFID Health Protocols
Nowadays there are a significant number of proposals on RFID authentication pro-
tocols (see, e.g., [50, 61, 138]), some of which have a clear focus on health appli-
cations, such as for example [109, 144, 174]). Nevertheless, the vast of majority of
these schemes, like the one in [164] analyzed in this section, suffer from various flaws
and have been proven to be insecure [40, 46, 76, 133]. This is mainly caused by the
usage of non-standard approaches that ignore prudent practices and well-established
principles in the design of security protocols, as well as a lack of rigorous security
analysis. In particular, Wu et al.’s scheme offers a rather standard gaming-based
security analysis, but the authors miscalculate probabilities. One major weakness
of this proposal lies in using a matrix multiplication-based classical cipher (Hill) as
cryptographic primitive for encryption. This is an old and largely insecure mecha-
nism [45, 64] that open doors to attacks like the one presented in this section.
Even though current passive RFID tags have rather limited on-chip capabilities,
they support some cryptographic functions, especially lightweight ones that have
been recently developed for this type of applications. Later in subsection 3.5.3 we
discuss implementation aspects and suggest specific algorithms to carry out these
functions. Building upon this assumption, in this subsection we introduce two RFID
security mechanisms based on existing standard designs adapted to healthcare en-
vironments. As a motivating examples, we will use two practical scenarios sketched
in Figures 3.17 and 3.18. The first case illustrates a typical application where mu-
tual authentication between two medical entities (e.g., a doctor and a patient, or
a doctor and a blood container) is required. The second scenario motivates the
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T and I: Tag and IMD
DB: Back-end Server (database)
IDX : Identification number of entity X
SSC: Send Sequence Counter
FXY : Keying material sent from X to Y
ACK Acknowledge message
ERR: Error message
KENC_XY : Authentication key shared between entities X and Y
KMAC_XY : Message authentication key shared between entities X and Y
KSENC_XY : Authentication session key shared between entities X and Y
KSMAC_XY : Message authentication session key shared between entities X and Y
[[M ]]K Encryption of message M with key K to provide confidentiality
{M}K Message Authentication Code (MAC) of message M with key K to
provide integrity
h(·) One-way compression function
f(·) Key Derivation Function (KDF)
Table 3.3: Notation used in the proposed authentication and secure messaging
schemes for health applications.
Step 3: DB → T : {c3, c4}. The back-end searches in its table the entry that sat-
isfies the value c0. More precisely, at the n-row it retrieves the new and old
index-pseudonyms and computes a local version of c0 (i.e., cnew0 and cold0 ). Then
DB checks whether one of the above values fits with the received one. If yes, the
tag is identified and its associated values are retrieved {KENC_TB, KMAC_TB}.
Otherwise, the above process is executed with the next entry (n+1-row) in
the table. The process is repeated until a match is found or the end of the
table is reached. The protocol is interrupted at this step if no matching oc-
curred and all the entries were checked. If not, once the tag is identified,
the database computes a local version of the MAC ((c′2 = {c′1}KMAC_TB)) and
checks its equality with the received value. The protocol is aborted whether
the above checking fails. Otherwise, DB decrypts c1 and obtains the identi-
fier of the target tag (IDT ). At this step the tag is authenticated (one-side
authentication). Then, the database encrypts the random numbers linked to
the session (c3 = [[NR,NT ]]KENC_TB), computes a MAC (c4 = {c3}KMAC_TB),
and both values are sent to the tag. Finally the current pseudonym is held
and the new pseudonym is updated using the one-way compression function:
IDSoldT = IDSnewT and IDSnewT = h(IDSnewT ).
Step 4: T : The tag calculates a local version of the MAC (c′4 = {c′3}KMAC_TB) and
decrypts message c3. If the MAC is correct and the nonces obtained match
with the nonces associated with the current session, the server is authenticated.
Therefore both sides are authenticated at this point and the mutual authen-
tication process finishes successfully. Finally, the tag updates its pseudonym
(IDST = h(IDST )). On the contrary, if some of the above checkings were
wrong, the tag sends an error message and an alarm is triggered in the protocol
the pseudonym updating is not executed in this case.
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RFID Tag (T ) RFID Reader (R) Back-end Database (DB)
{IDT , IDST ,KENC_TB ,KMAC_TB} IDDB, {{IDS}{new,old},KENC_TB ,KMAC_TB}
NR = PRNG
Query,NR←−−−−−−−−−−−−
NT = PRNG
c0 = h(IDST ,NT ,NR)
c1 = [[NT , NR, IDT ]]KENC_TB
c2 = {c1}KMAC_TB
NT ,c0,c1,c2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NT ,NR,c0,c1,c2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check c0 and identify the interrogated T
Check c′2 = {c′1}KMAC_TB ,
Find IDT ([[NT , NR, IDT ]]−1KENC_TB )
Compute c3 = [[NR,NT ]]KENC_TB ,
Compute c4 = {c3}KMAC_TB .
Update IDST :
IDSoldT = IDS
new
T and IDS
new
T = h(IDS
new
T )
c3,c4←−−−−−−−−−−−−
c3,c4←−−−−
Check c′4 = {c3}KMAC_TB
Verify NR and NT ([[NR,NT ]]−1KENC_TB )
Update IDST : IDST = h(IDST )
Figure 3.19: Entity Authentication Protocol
3.5.2 Secure Messaging
Apart from authentication, there are many medical applications that demand the
exchange of private information. For instance, nowadays the new generation of
medical implants possess wireless connectivity. Imagine a doctor equipped with
a reader aims to access the records of vital signals stored on the memory of an
implant. In this scenario, the doctor (reader) and the patient (implant) are first
mutually authenticated and then a secure exchange of data can be performed. The
process is displayed in Figure 3.18 and the details are given below.
Thirteen protocols using symmetric encryption algorithms are specified in the
ISO/IEC 11770 Part 2 standard. Six of them are server-less, while the other seven
require a trusted server. As in electronic passports [77], we opt for ISO-IEC 11770
Mechanism 6. Moreover, the special characteristics of wireless-medical systems like
the anonymous identification through an insecure (radio) channel or its energy re-
strictions have been considered.
The entities involved in the protocol are the implant (I), the reader (R) and
the database (DB). I and DB share an authentication key (KENC_IB), a mes-
sage authentication key (KMAC_IB), and its identifiers are IDI and IDDB, re-
spectively. The anonymous identification of implants is guaranteed by the use of
pseudonyms (IDSI), which are updated once the authentication process has been
successfully completed. At the same time, a copy of the old and current values
(IDSnewI , IDSoldI ) are held in the database to avoid de-synchronization attacks.
The database keeps a table in which each row stores the information of a particular
implant: {IDS{new,old}I , KENC_IB, KMAC_IB}. The pseudonym is used as a search
index in the database to retrieve the information linked to the interrogated implant
(KENC_IB, KMAC_IB). The scheme requires an encryption algorithm, a MAC al-
gorithm, a one-way compression function, a pseudo-random number generator, and
a KDF. The exchanged messages, shown in Figure 3.20, in our three-pass mutual
authentication protocol plus two-pass secure messaging scheme are described bellow:
Step 1: R → I: NR. The reader sends a query signal and a random value NR to
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Implant (I) RFID Reader (R) Back-end Database (DB)
{IDI ,KENC_IB ,KMAC_IB} IDDB, {IDS{new,old}I ,
KENC_IB ,KMAC_IB}
Mutual Authentication
& Key Exchange
NR = PRNG
Query,NR←−−−−−−−−−−−−
NI = PRNG
c0 = h(IDSI ,NI ,NR)
Generate FIB
c1 = [[NI , NR, IDI , FID]]KENC_IB
c2 = {c1}KMAC_IB
NI ,c0,c1,c2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NR,c1,c2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check c0 and identify I
Check c′2 = {c′1}KMAC_IB ,
Find IDI and FIB :
([[NT , NR, IDI ]]−1KENC_IB )
Generate FBI ,
c3 = [[NR,NT , FBI ]]KENC_IB ,
c4 = {c3}KMAC_IB .
Update IDSI :
IDSoldI = IDS
new
I
IDSnewI = h(IDS
new
I )
c3,c4←−−−−−−−−−−−−
c3,c4←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Check c′4 = {c3}KMAC_IB
Verify NI and NR,
and find FBI :
([[NR,NI , FBI ]]−1KENC_IB ).
Update IDSI : IDSI = h(IDSI)
Secure Messaging
m1 = [[Mi]]KSENC_IB
SCC = SCC + 1
m2 = {m1, SCC}KSMAC_IB
m1,m2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
m1,m2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
SCC = SCC + 1
If (m′2 = {m′1, SCC}KSMAC_IB ))
Then Mi ([[Mi]]−1KSENC_IB )
ACK(ERR)←−−−−−−−−−−−−
ACK(ERR)←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3.20: Secure Messaging Scheme
the implant.
Step 2: I → R: NI , c0, c1, c2. The implant generates a random number (NI)
and keying material (FIB) and computes a fresh version of its pseudonym
(c0 = h(IDSI ,NI ,NR)) that facilitates its anonymous identification. Then
I computes an encrypted message that includes the random number received
and the one generated on-board, keying material, and its static identifier (c1 =
[[NI ,NR, IDI , FIB]]KENC_IB). Then a MAC is computed (c2 = {c1}KMAC_IB)
and the aforementioned values (i.e., {c0, c1, c2}) together with the nonce NI
are sent to the reader and finally forwarded to the database.
Step 3: DB → T : {c3, c4}. The back-end searches in its table the entry that
satisfies the value c0. In detail, at the n-row it retrieves the new and old
index-pseudonyms and computes a local version of c0 (i.e., cnew0 and cold0 ).
Then DB checks whether one of these computed values fits with the received
one. If yes, the implant is identified and its associated values are retrieved
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{KENC_IB, KMAC_IB}. Otherwise, the above process is executed with the
next entry (n+1-row) in the table. The process is repeated until a match
is found or the end of the table is reached. The protocol is interrupted at
this step if no matching occurred and all the entries were checked. If not,
once the implant is identified, the database computes a local version of the
MAC (c′2 = {c′1}KMAC_IB) and checks its equality with the received value. If
the above checking fails, the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, DB decrypts
c1 and obtains the identifier of the implant (IDI) and the keying material
generated by the other side (FIB). At this step, the implant is authenticated
(one-side authentication). Next, the database generates keying material (FBI)
and encrypts this value together with the nonces linked to the session (c3 =
[[NR,NI , FBI ]]KENC_IB) and computes a MAC (c4 = {c3}KMAC_IB). After that,
both values are sent to the implant. Finally the current pseudonym is held
and the new pseudonym is updated using the one-way compression function:
IDSoldI = IDSnewI and IDSnewI = h(IDSnewI ).
Step 4: I: The implant calculates a local version of the MAC (c4′ = {c′3}KMAC_IB)
and decrypts message c3. If the MAC is correct and the nonces obtained match
the nonces associated with the current session, the server is authenticated.
Thus, both sides are authenticated at this step, the mutual authentication
process finishes successfully and the implant updates its pseudonym (IDSI =
h(IDSI)). If some of the above checkings were wrong, the implant sends
an error message, an alarm is triggered in the protocol, and the pseudonym
updating is not executed. Note that, apart from authentication, the implant
also received the keying material from the database (FBI).
Step 5: Session Key Derivation: Once authentication is completed, the implant
and the database calculate the session keys. We use a Key Derivation Function
(KDF; f(·)) with two inputs (FIB and FBI). In particular, we follow the KDF
in counter mode specified in NIST 800-108 recommendation (see Sect. 5.1 in
[123] for details). Following this algorithm, two fresh keys KSENC_IB and
KSMAC_IB are shared between both entities. Furthermore, as in [77] speci-
fication (see page IV-40; Section A.5.4.2) a Send Sequence Counter (SSC) is
computed from the two random numbers linked to the session: e.g., SSC = NI
(2 least significant bytes), NB (2 least significant bytes).
After that, a secure exchange of data can be accomplished. For each data
block (Mi) the following procedure is followed:
Step 6: I → DB: m1,m2. First the implant encrypts Mi with KSENC_IB (m1 =
[[Mi]]KSENC_IB). Then the MAC of m1 is computed following three steps: 1)
SSC is incremented with 1; 2) SCC is padded to m1, and 3) the MAC with
KSENC_IB is calculated (i.e., {m1, SCC}KSENC_IB). Next these two values
({m1,m2}) are sent to the reader and finally forwarded to the database.
Step 7: I → DB: ACK or ERR: The database computes a local version of the
MAC. More precisely, SCC is incremented with one and padded to the received
m′1 and finally the MAC is computed (i.e.,m′2 = {m′1, SCC}KSENC_IB). If both
values match, the data block is decrypted ([[Mi]]−1KSENC_IB) and an acknowledge
message (ACK) is sent to the implant. Otherwise, an error message (ERR)
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is sent to the implant.
3.5.3 Implementation Aspects
The two applications presented in this section rely on the use of several crypto-
graphic primitives: encryption, one-way compression, MAC, PRNG, and key deriva-
tion functions. As we next discuss, the proposed primitives use a block cipher as
the core component of each algorithm. RFID tags can be classified regarding its
operating frequency or its source of power as described in Section 3.1. On the other
hand, price is a crucial factor that determines tag capabilities (e.g., memory and
power computation). Low-cost and high-cost tags are the two main classes with
respect to this parameter. The size of the chip and, consequently, its capabilities
is directly linked to its price. Low-cost tags have a price that varies from 10 to
30 cents, with around 3000-5000 gates equivalents that can be devoted to security
purposes [7]. Adequate implementations of standard block ciphers like Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), or modern designs like PRESENT, can be used in
such tags [25, 94]. Even though in our proposal all primitives are based on a block
cipher, the tag must support several algorithms and it does not seem plausible that
all of them would fit in a low-cost tag. Consequently, we recommend the usage of
high-cost tags. These have a market price of 1-2 dollars, which is reasonable for
medical environments. In this sort of tags, more than 7000 gates equivalents are
available for security issues [21, 57], and the overprice is justified by the high security
level demanded in medical applications, particularly when the safety of patients is
a vital factor in these environments [41, 133].
We next discuss in detail the cryptographic building blocks used in our proposal.
As in the case of the protocols presented above, all constructions are based on
ISO/IEC standards and NIST recommendations.
3.5.3.1 Encryption Algorithm
The first key aspect is the adoption of symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic
approaches. We discard public cryptography due to the current scarcity of resources
in constrained devices like low-cost RFID tags or IMDs. Our two proposals described
above use a lightweight and secure cipher. We can opt for standard approaches, such
as for example the tiny implementation of AES [58] or more recent lightweight block
ciphers like PRESENT [28] or KATAN family [36]. Stream ciphers like Grain [73]
or Trivium [118] could also be used, but we discard this option since the MAC
algorithm will be based on the cipher and stream-cipher-based MAC algorithm are
not standardized.
3.5.3.2 One-way Compression Function
A one-way compression function is a function that transforms a fixed-length input
into a fixed-length output, being difficult to compute an input given a particular
output. This sort of functions are often build using block ciphers like the mentioned
in the previous section. In detail, these make use of the following components: 1) a
block cipher with block size L, called CIPH and parametrized by a symmetric key
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K; 2) a function g with maps L-bit inputs to keys K suitable for CIPH; and 3) a
fixed L-bit initial value. In the literature, there are several proposed algorithms:
Davies-Meyer, Matyas-Meyer-Oseas and Miyaguchi-Preneel [116]. This latter is de-
scribed below. The input M (i.e., h(M)) is divided into L-bit blocks and padded,
if necessary, to completed the last block Mm: M1||M2|| · · · ||Mm, where m = |M |/L
and || symbolizes concatenation. Then the algorithm is executed as follows:
Hash Algorithm
(Miyaguchi-Preneel construction)
1. H0 = IV
2. For i = 1 to m
3. Hi = CIPHg(Hi−1)(Mi)⊕Mi ⊕Hi−1.
4. T = Hm
5. Return T
3.5.3.3 MAC Algorithm
We propose the use of a MAC algorithm based on a symmetric-key block cipher,
since this primitive is already used in the protocol and we can easily reuse it. This
cipher-based MAC is abbreviated as Cipher-based MAC (CMAC). Our algorithm
follows the NIST 800-38B Recommendation [122]. We assume that we have a block
cipher with block size L, called CIPH, and a shared key (K). Moreover, for sub-key
generation we follow the guidelines dictated in [122] (NIST 800-38B, pages 7-8); the
sub-keys (K1 and K2) are generated and stored in the memory of entities involved
(i.e., tag and database) at the key distribution phase. To compute the MAC of
message M (i.e., {M}K), M is divided into blocks of L bits: M1||M2|| · · ·Mm,
where m = |M |/L and || denotes concatenation. As specified in [122], the last
block is XORed with K2 or K1, depending if padding is needed or not.The CMAC
algorithm is described below:
CMAC Algorithm
(compliant with NIST 800-38B)
1. C0 = 0L
2. For i = 1 to m
3. Ci = CIPHK(Ci−1 ⊕Mi).
4. T = Cm
5. Return T
3.5.3.4 Pseudo-random Number Generator
Apart from the Hash and MAC algorithms, random numbers are used in the pro-
tocol. We opt for an standard approach again. As specified in NIST 800-38A [121]
(recommendation for block ciphers modes of operation), we propose the use of a
block cipher in counter mode, denoted CTR. The current value of the counter is
called Tj and RN represents the resulting L/2-bits random number, L being the
block size for the used block-cipher. The initial value of the counter is set at the
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key distribution phase, i.e., T0 = random_seed. After each nonce generation, the
counter value is updated to Tj+1. The algorithm is described below:
PRNG: Block cipher in CTR Mode
(compliant with NIST 800-38A)
1. Oj = CIPHk(Tj)
2. RN = |Oj |0···(L/2−1)
3. Tj+1 = |Oj |L/2···L
3.5.3.5 Key Derivation Function
As specified in NIST 800-108 [123], we propose the use of a KDF in counter mode
and the CMAC primitive is used as the Pseudorandom Function (PRF). The key
derivation function is calculated by xoring the keying materials exchanged in the
first phase of the protocol (Kl = FID⊕FDI). Next, the session keys KSENC_IB and
KSMAC_IB are generated. In the following, we assume that the bit length of these
keys are r times the length of the used block-cipher with block size L. Depending
on whether the key is used for encryption or MAC, the Fixed Input Data (FID) take
one of these values: (0x 00 00 00 00 00 01 || 0x 00 || IDI) or (0x 00 00 00 00 00 02
|| 0x 00 || IDI).
Key Derivation Function – CTR Mode
(compliant with NIST 800-108)
1. result = [];
2. For i = 1 to r, do
3. K(i) = CMACKl(i, F ID)
4. result(i) = result(i− 1) || K(i)
5. Return KS = leftmost (r · L) bits of result.
3.6 Conclusions
In the last years, several RFID-based solutions have been proposed to solve a vari-
ety of problems in healthcare environments. These proposals deal with interesting
applications, such as monitoring of Alzheimer patients or intelligent drug adminis-
tration systems. Unfortunately, the majority of such schemes, like the one by Wu et
al. [164] analysed in this chapter, have resulted poor from the security point of view
[40, 46, 76, 133]. In general, such a lack of security is due to two main reasons: (i)
the use of non-standard constructions that do not follow prudent design practices
and established recommendations; and (ii) informal and/or non-rigorous security
analysis.
With the aim of avoiding these common mistakes, we have proposed two new
RFID protocols for healthcare environments based on standards and recommenda-
tions. More precisely, the security schemes proposed conform to ISO/IEC 9798 and
11770. The security of the standards included in these specifications has been deeply
studied in the literature. This provides, in our opinion, more confidence than ad-hoc
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designs. Furthermore, we provide details about implementation aspects by following
NIST Security Recommendations. Finally, we hope that schemes such as those here
proposed can give support to additional RFID-based healthcare applications and
stimulate further research in the area.
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4
Secure Publish-Subscribe
Protocols for Heterogeneous
Medical Wireless Body Area
Networks
4.1 Introduction
The development of reasonably powerful wearable sensors and medical devices has
stimulated research in WBANs applied to healthcare scenarios. A prototypical sce-
nario is that of a patient equipped with a number of wearable and implantable
sensors that constantly measures various health-related parameters. Sensors are
networked, meaning that they have communication capabilities and can interact
with each other and with a central network controller that provides coordination,
long-term storage, etc. The WBAN is often assumed to possess the ability to con-
nect with external entities, for example, through an Internet connection. This would
allow healthcare staff to monitor the patient remotely, continuously, and in real time
[103], even using automatically generated prognoses of the patient’s health condi-
tions with methodologies such as the one proposed in [128]). Overall, the possibilities
offered by WBAN technologies in the healthcare domain are potentially huge, rang-
ing from the ubiquitous provisioning of healthcare services to enhanced emergency
medical response systems and technologies to promote healthier living styles.
Wearable and implantable medical sensors and devices constitute an already es-
tablished industry. For example, the market of IMDs has been progressively growing
year after year and it is expected to be worth more than $43 billion in 2011 and
more than $70 billion in 2018, according to a research made by Transparency Mar-
ket Research [155]. IMDs are usually given as small microchips located inside the
human body to perform some medical-related function. The most common include
pacemakers, defibrillators, cochlear implants, insulin pumps, and neurostimulators.
In their current generation (or in a near future), all of them share a common fea-
ture: wireless communication capabilities [127]. Moreover, IMDs have the ability to
support and store telemetry data facilitating the remote monitoring of the patient.
IMDs can be part of a WBANs, operating both as sensors and as actuators and
making decisions in real time.
In recent years, the proliferation of smartphones and other mobile “smart” devices
with substantial computational and communication capabilities have reshaped the
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way WBANs may be implemented. Many works put a smartphone as WBAN central
node, using Bluetooth and Wi-Fi connections to group together all wearable sensors
and devices. Apps running on the smartphone and other smart wearable devices
provide an interface to access sensor data, which can be forwarded to healthcare
staff using the smartphone Internet connection. Offloading computing and storage
capabilities to the cloud has also been suggested to overcome the limitations of
wearable devices [31, 107]
Security and privacy issues have been described as two of the most challenging
problems of IMDs and, more generally, WBANs [6, 47, 84, 103]. As an example, it
has been demonstrated that somebody equipped with a low cost device can eaves-
drop on the data communicated with a pacemaker and may even induce a cardiac
arrest [71]. Health-related data have been the focus of several attacks almost since
the adoption of computers in the healthcare domain. The most important security
and privacy challenges in WBANs for healthcare scenarios include:
• Data confidentiality. Data generated in the WBAN is highly sensitive and
must be encrypted both at storage and during transmission, so that users
without the appropriate keys cannot access the data [34, 142].
• Data integrity and authentication. It must be ensured that a message has
been generated by a valid sensor and that it has not been tampered with by an
adversary. Data integrity and authentication can be attained using standard
cryptographic techniques in WBANs [34, 103, 142].
• Fine-grained access control. In this context, fine-grained refers to the
granularity of the data access policy defined to specify and enforce different
access privileges for different users. Trade-offs between access control and
efficiency/usability must be considered, as a higher level of privacy discloses
less information but incurs more costs while a lower privacy level leaks more
details but may be efficient [70, 103, 178].
• Software security. Code running in medical devices should be carefully
designed and analysed [34]. Software vulnerabilities in a WBAN sensor or
actuator may have serious consequences for the patient’s privacy and, in some
cases, even lead to life-threatening situations.
• Limited capabilities. Most implantable and wearable devices are battery-
operated and suffer from severe restrictions in their computing and communi-
cation capabilities. Thus, while many traditional embedded systems can rely
on cryptographic measures without limitations, this must be carefully consid-
ered for implantable and wearable medical devices [47, 103].
• Realistic threat and operation models. Currently there are not clearly
established models for the typical operation mode of a WBAN and the asso-
ciated threat model(s). For example, it seems clear that a compromise of one
WBAN node (e.g., if it is lost or stolen) should not put at risk other data or de-
vices [34, 103], but more comprehensive security models are needed. Similarly,
it is unclear how to manage critical medical situations in which unauthorized
users (e.g., paramedics, doctors belonging to a foreign hospital, etc.) can de-
tect the presence of medical devices, get immediate access to them, and even
be able to switch them off or reconfigure them [47]. How to efficiently and
securely deal with this is still an open problem.
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• Availability. Sensory data and wearable medical services must be available at
all times. More importantly, data and services should be able to dynamically
adapt to contexts, such as time, location, or certain events related to patients,
and this data should be correct even under Byzantine node failure [103, 142].
4.1.1 Contribution and Organization
In this chapter, we introduce a WBAN architecture based on the publish-subscribe
messaging paradigm for wearable and implantable sensors and devices. The WBAN
is thus viewed as a shared bus where a number of entities sensors, apps residing
in wearable smart devices, external users, etc. produce data and subscribe to the
data feed provided by another entities. We present two protocols for publishing data
and sending commands to a sensor that guarantee confidentiality and fine-grained
access control. Our protocols are based on a recently proposed CP-ABE scheme
that is lightweight enough to be embedded into wearable sensors [69].
Contrarily to other WBAN papers based on CP-ABE schemes, in our architecture
sensors can encrypt data but also decrypt messages generated by other devices. This
allows for a flexible, scalable, and highly versatile architecture where services can
be dynamically composed by subscribing to the data feeds published by wearable
sensors. One major restriction of our chosen CP-ABE scheme is that only AND-
based policies can be formed. Nonetheless, we show that this suffices to implement
Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC) [147] policies, which are highly appropriate
for the e-health domain.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In subsection 4.2 we provide
some background on ABE techniques and, in particular, on CP-ABE. Our proposed
solution is described in subsection 4.3 and evaluated in subsection 4.4, both in
terms of security and experimental efficiency. Subsection 4.5 provides an overview of
related work in WBAN for healthcare applications. Finally, subsection 4.6 concludes
the chapter and discusses our ongoing and future work in this area.
4.2 Preliminaries
For completeness and readability, we next provide a brief overview of the crypto-
graphic primitives used in the protocols proposed in this chapter.
4.2.1 Attribute Based Encryption
ABE was firstly presented by Sahai and Waters in [145] as a new way to provide
authenticated users with encrypted access control. ABE is a type of public cryp-
tography technique where messages are encrypted with both a private key and a
ciphertext that correspond to the user’s public attributes. Data can be decrypted
by everyone whose attributes satisfy the policy set by the encryptor. Traditionally,
the cost of these schemes in terms of computation, private key size, and ciphertext
size increases exponentially with the number of the attributes used. However, re-
cent advances have demonstrated that even some lightweight devices such as RFID
labels can implement ABE decryption [69]. Additionally, ABE cryptography is one
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of the most suitable cryptographic way to provide access control while having low
computation and storage overhead [103].
ABE schemes can be categorized in four different types:
• Key-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE), proposed by Goyal
et al. [66] in 2006 to achieve fine-grained access control in a more flexible man-
ner than ABE schemes. KP-ABE introduces more complex access structures
(policies) to encrypt messages: boolean formula including AND and OR oper-
ations. Additionally, each decryption key is based on a set of public attributes
S. Finally, a user who wants to decrypt a message must match her attributes
with the ciphertext. This is a disadvantage because the owner cannot choose
who is able to decrypt messages.
• Non-monotonic ABE was proposed by Ostrovsky et al. [125] in 2007. In
this work, the authors extended the traditional ABE scheme by introducing a
boolean formula where AND, OR, NOT, and threshold operations are avail-
able. The scheme has overhead problems because of negative clauses, which
make it infeasible to be developed in constrained devices.
• CP-ABE was proposed by Bethencourt et al. [24] in 2007. The authors
presented an ABE scheme that corrects one of the disadvantages of KP-ABE,
namely the ability of choosing who will be able to decrypt messages. To
do so, the authors switch encryption and decryption algorithms, including
the attribute set S into the ciphertext and a policy into the key. With this
change, the ciphertext is encrypted with a tree access policy and users who
want to decrypt a message must match a set of attributes. The scheme’s
main disadvantage is a high computational cost in the decryption algorithm,
particularly if S is large since the more attributes the policy has, the higher
the tree is.
• Hierarchical Attribute-Based Encryption (HABE) was proposed by
Wang et al. [158] in 2011 and uses policies in disjunctive normal form, where
disjunctions are used to express the access control policy and conjunctions are
used to manage all attributes. The scheme does not allow to define fine-grained
access control policies, but this can be achieved by combining both Hierarchi-
cal Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) and CP-ABE. HABE is unsuitable to
be implemented in real systems because it is assumed that all attributes in one
conjunctive clause may be managed by the same authority, which may cause
that the same attribute could be managed by multiple authorities.
In 2011, Waters developed a general method to construct a CP-ABE scheme
using linear secret sharing techniques [160]. This is the most efficient scheme to date.
Additionally, in order to solve the high computational cost that decryption involves,
Green et al. [67] proposed to offload ABE decryption (KP-ABE and CP-ABE) to an
external cloud server. To do so, the authors transform an ABE ciphertext satisfied
by a particular set of user attributes into a constant-size ciphertext.
In our work, we rely on CP-ABE schemes because of two main reasons: (i) it is
the most suitable option when there are computational constraints [69, 160]; (and
ii) the party who encrypts the message chooses who can access the data [24].
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4.2.2 CP-ABE Definitions
We next provide a brief background on CP-ABE schemes. We first introduce the
notion of access structure, then describe bilinear maps and the variation of the Diffie-
Hellman’s algorithm known as augmented Multi-Sequence of Exponents Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (aMSE-DDH) used in this work, and finally discuss the security
model of CP-ABE.
4.2.2.1 Access Structure
We denote by U the attribute universe description and by A a collection of attributes
A1,A2, . . . ,An, with Ai ∈ {0, 1}. A is an access structure over U given by a collection
of non-empty subsets of U, where the sets specified by A are called the authorized
set. Each time a user joins the system, a list of attributes is assigned to him,
implicitly indicating what privileges he will have in the system.
4.2.2.2 Bilinear Pairings
Definition 1. Let p, r be two different primes, G an elliptic group, g a generator of
G, and e a bilinear map: e : G×G→ G with the next properties:
• Bilinear: ∀u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
• Non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1
• Efficient: there exists an efficient algorithm to calculate e(u, v)∀u, v ∈ G
• Symmetric: e is symmetric since e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga)
4.2.2.3 aMSE-DDH
The aMSE-DDH problem is a slight modification of the multi-sequence of exponents
decisional Diffie-Hellman problem considered in [48].
Definition 2. Let x, y, z be three integers. As demonstrated in [74], for any proba-
bilistic algorithm B making at most n queries using bilinear groups of prime order
p, the advantage in solving the aMSE-DDH problem is:
Adv
(x,y,z)−(aMSE−DDH)
B (λ) =
(n+ 2s+ 2)2 · d
2p (4.1)
Where s = 4y + 3x+ z + 3 and d = max{2(x+ 2), 2(y + 2), 4(y − z) + 10}
4.2.3 CP-ABE Algorithms
A CP-ABE scheme implements four polynomial-time algorithms: Setup(), KeyGen(),
Encrypt(), and Decrypt(). Additionally, some CP-ABE schemes implement a fifth
method, named Delegate(), that is used to give temporal access to a given user who
is usually not allowed to access that information.
• Setup(λ,A). This method requires as input both a security parameter λ and
the number of attributes defined in the system. It outputs two parameters: a
public parameter PK and a master key MK.
• KeyGen(MK,S). This method requires as input both the master keyMK and
a set of attributes S that describe the key. It returns a private key SK.
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• Encrypt(PK,M, T ). This method requires as input three values: the public
parameters PK, the message M , and the access structure T . The algorithm
encrypts M and outputs a ciphertext CT which will only decrypt if and only
if the user’s attributes satisfy the access structure. We assume that T is
implicitly included in CT .
• Decrypt(PK,CT , SK). This method requires as input three values: the public
parameters PK, a ciphertext CT (with the access policy), and a private key
SK for an attribute set. The method returns a decrypted message M only if
the set of attributes satisfies the access structure embedded in CT ; otherwise,
it will return the error symbol ⊥.
• Delegate(SK, Sˆ). This method requires as input a secret key SK (associated
with a set of attributes S) and another set Sˆ such that Sˆ ⊆ S. It outputs a
private key ŜK for the set Sˆ.
4.2.4 Security Model
The Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) security model is based on the IND-sAtt-CPA
game, which is a simulation where the adversary tries to attack an encrypted message
without a decryption key whose attributes satisfy the message access policy. The
game between an adversary and a challenger is described as follows.
Definition 3. A CP-ABE scheme is said to be secure against an adaptive CPA if
any polynomial-time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the IND-sAtt-CPA
game, where the advantage is defined to be Adv = |Pr[b′ = b]− 1|.
• Setup: The challenger starts the algorithm and runs the Setup() method to
generate a key pair (PK, SK) with a security parameter λ, and sends PK to
the adversary.
• Phase 1: For each attribute Ai ∈ A, the adversary gets its secret key SKi
by making requests to the KeyGen() method. The adversary cannot ask for a
Ai /∈ T , where T is his access structure.
• Challenge: The adversary creates two messages M0 and M1 with len(M0) =
len(M1) and an access structure P . Because this structure cannot be satisfied
by any SKi, the challenger picks a random r ∈ {0, 1} and returns the result
(C) of the method Encrypt(PK,Mr,P).
• Query: The adversary can continue querying the KeyGen() method with the
same restriction as in Phase 1.
• The adversary finally gets a guess for r: r∗ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if
r∗ = r.
The advantage of an adversary is defined by Adv = Pr[r∗ = r]− 12 .
Definition 4. The CP-ABE scheme is fully secure against Chosen-Ciphertext At-
tack (CCA) (CCA-secure) if all polynomial time adversaries have only a negligible
advantage for λ in this game, i.e., Pr[CP− ABE(λ,U) = 1] ≤ 12 + negl(λ)
It is worth noting that a CP-ABE scheme has all the properties defined in [101]
and can be easily adapted to be secure against selective security by adding an ini-
tialization phase where the attacker must declare A before seeing PK. Additionally,
it is secure against CPA (CPA-secure) because calls to Decrypt() are not allowed in
Phases 1 and 2 above.
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4.3 Our Solution
We next describe our proposed solution. We first provide and architectural overview
and discuss the system model. We next describe the three procedures supported in
our scheme: setup, publish, and command protocols.
4.3.1 Architecture and System Model
Our solution considers a Body Area Network (BAN) composed of heterogeneous de-
vices in terms of computational and communications capabilities. We assume that
many of them are equipped with sensors that provide a number of physical and phys-
iological parameters of the bearer, such as the Electrocardiogram (ECG), Galvanic
Skin Response (GSR), temperature, heart rate, position, etc. Some devices could
be “smart”, meaning that they can execute third-party apps (e.g., a smartphone
or a smartwatch), while others could just be wearable or implantable sensors with
limited functionality.
At high level, our BAN uses a publish-subscribe architecture [55]. This is a
well-known message-oriented system in which parties (i.e., BAN nodes) can play
two different roles: nodes who create new events are called publishers and nodes
who consume events are called subscribers. Note that in our model “node” is an
application-layer entity and should not be viewed as a physical device. For example,
a powerful device with various sensors may support various apps running on it,
each one publishing a different sensed signal. Similarly, a device may host several
subscribers and no provider (e.g., a portable monitor running various apps that
provide the bearer with information about his state).
This architecture presents several advantages. For instance, it makes it possible
for one sensor to subscribe to the data feed published by another sensor and pro-
duce an output that depends on it. This allows for more complex functions to be
embedded into wearable devices. For example, a heart rate sensor could subscribe
to a location sensor (i.e., GPS) and provide data correlated to the bearer’s speed.
Furthermore, it makes possible for a sensor to have access to a signal whenever there
is another sensor that publishes it in the BAN. Finally, it provides good scalability
and flexibility, allowing dynamic topologies among sensor services and, therefore,
very powerful applications based on fusing and processing different signals.
In summary, our WBAN architecture can be seen at three different levels (see
Fig. 4.1):
• At the physical and network layer, devices will typically organize in a star
topology where each node directly communicates with a network hub. This
is the traditional approach in most WBANs, with the network hub being a
dedicated network controller or, more recently, a smartphone. For reasons
that will be clearer later, it is important that such a WBAN controller has
sufficient computational resources. The hub will also act as gateway for ac-
cessing external services (i.e., the Internet or other devices in the proximity of
the WBAN), and in many cases will also provide storage capabilities to other
sensors. This, however, can be delegated to another device.
• At the middleware layer, we refer to “entities” rather than to physical sen-
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sensor is configured with a policy service that determines what attributes an entity
must possess in order to access the data. Such a policy may be fixed (e.g., you need
to be a doctor or a nurse to access data published by an ECG sensor) or may depend
on the context (e.g., location, state of the patient, readings of other sensors, etc.).
The common approach in WBANs to grant access rights to patient-related data
is to follow a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [103]. In a healthcare
setting, an RBAC approach classifies users according to their professional roles (e.g.,
doctors, nurses, admin staff, etc.) and defines policies based on those roles and,
perhaps, on external conditions (context) too. CP-ABE supports policies with a
tree-like structure, which are adequate to model expressive authorization sentences
using roles and context parameters as attributes. Thus, whenever a WBAN sensor
generates some data, it builds the ciphertext according to the appropriate access
control policy for this particular piece of data.
One major restriction of using the scheme proposed in [69] is that it only sup-
ports AND policies. This restricts the types of policies supported in our proposal,
although the possibility of having decryption services on-board allows for more com-
plex decision-making since some sensors can decrypt what others publish. Rather
than using roles, our current policies are based on LBAC [147]. LBAC is not sig-
nificantly less expressive than RBAC and fits well the idea of using only AND
connectives in the policies. In LBAC, access control policies define a partial order
and can be visualized as the Hasse diagram associated with the associated poset. A
classical application of such policies is in multilevel security systems, where data is
labelled according to its sensitivity level using a number of classification levels (e.g.,
public, confidential, secret, top-secret). Moreover, in order to comply with the need-
to-know principle access to information should only be granted if it is necessary for
the requester. This gives rise to the use of compartments. In a healthcare scenario,
such compartments could correspond to departments or healthcare services.
We will use the following toy example to illustrate the type of LBAC policies
supported in our system. Assume a WBAN composed of medical and sport sensors.
Medical sensors can be grouped as cardiology-related and neurology-related. The
information generated by the sensors belongs to three categories: public (e.g., the
heart rate), confidential (e.g., the ECG or the Electroencephalography (EEG)), and
sensitive. The combination of these levels and compartments give rise to the Hasse
diagram shown in Fig. 4.2. This could be implemented using a set of 5 attributes:
A = {public, confidential, sensitive, neuro, cardio}
so that each entity (sensors, apps, and users) are provided with a key associated
with a subset of A. Note that if a user is given an attribute of level l, he must be
also given all attributes corresponding to the levels below.
Additional attributes can be created for specific privileges. For example, the
ability to reconfigure a sensor can be explicitly modelled as a separate attribute.
4.3.2 Setup
Each entity (sensor, device, app, etc.) belonging to the WBAN needs to be initialized
with the appropriate keys by a Key Generation Center (KGC). The KGC is operated
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public
confidential, cardio
sensitive
confidential, cardio, neuro
confidential, neuro
sensitive, cardio sensitive, neuro
sensitive, cardio, neuro
Figure 4.2: Hasse diagram for an example LBAC policy using 3 security levels and
2 compartments.
by the healthcare provider and produces the public parameters PK and a master key
MK using the Setup(λ,A) method with policy attributes A. Each entity who wants
to join the WBAN must be provided with PK and a secret key SK generated by
the KGC using the KeyGen(MK,S) method, where S is the set of attributes (and,
therefore, the access privileges) chosen for the entity.
Once initialized with the appropriate cryptographic material, the entity registers
with the WBAN controller and retrieves the list of available sensors (publishers).
After this, it can publish it owns contents and subscribe to other sensors’ data
feeds using the Application Programming Interface (API) provided by the messaging
middleware.
4.3.3 Publish Protocol
When a sensor Si wants to publish data in the data bus, it follows the following
procedure:
1. Let d be the piece of data to be published. The sensor Si must determine under
what access policy d will be published. We assume the existence of a policy
service stored within the sensor that returns the access structureA required for
this particular piece of data: A ← PubPolicy(d) Note that PubPolicy() may be
as simple as a fixed access policy stored within the sensor, but also arbitrarily
complex. For example, a powerful sensor may determine the access structure
for a particular piece of data as a function of the location (e.g., whether at
home, in the street, at the hospital, etc.), the time of the day, or even the
physical state of the bearer. Thus, Si may need access to external sources
of information, including other sensor in the BAN, to determine the context
where the publication of d takes place.
2. Si keeps a list of recently used access structures A and the associated access
token. An access token is just a symmetric key that will be required to actually
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get access to d. The list contains the following four elements:
[id(K),A,Encrypt(PKSi , K,A), texp]
where:
• id(K) is the identifier of the access token (symmetric key) K.
• A is the data structure.
• Encrypt(PKSi , K,A is the CP-ABE encryption of the symmetric key K
using A.
• texp is an expiration date after which this access token is no longer valid.
After determining the access structure A for this particular d, Si checks
whether a not expired access token is already available. If so, it retrieves
it and uses that K in Step 3; otherwise, it creates a new one associated with
A by randomly choosing a symmetric key K. The new access token is sent to
the bus so that it becomes available to already subscribed consumers:
Si → Bus : [id(K),A,Encrypt(PKSi , K,A), texp]
3. Si sends the following message to the bus:
Si → Bus : [Si, t, id(K), EK(d ‖ t)]
where:
• Si is the sensor’s identity.
• t is a timestamp.
• id(K) is the identifier of the access token K.
• EK(d ‖ t) is the symmetric encryption of d concatenated with t using key
K.
4. When a data consumer R who is subscribed to Si’s messages receives a new
post, it checks id(K) and determines whether the corresponding access to-
ken is available or not. If this is the first message received with this access
structure (e.g., because R has just subscribed to Si’s messages or because Si
has changed the access policy for this piece of data), R must retrieve from Si
the corresponding access token. This is done using the Command Protocol
described in the next section. Once retrieved, it executes
Decrypt(PKR,Encrypt(PKSi , K,A), SKR)
to obtain K (if R has sufficient privileges) and, subsequently, the symmetric
decryption DK(EK(d)) to retrieve d and check t.
The entire protocol is illustrated in Fig. 4.3.
4.3.4 Command Protocol
The Command Protocol implements the “get” and “set” functionalities common in
many distributed services. It is used whenever a requester, either a device within
the BAN or an external entity, commands a sensor Si to carry out an action. Such
an action may be:
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checks whether R has sufficient privileges to require the execution of c. We
assume the existence of a command policy service stored in the sensor that
returns the privileges (i.e, access structure) T required to request the execution
of c:
T = CmdPolicy(c)
Now, Si challenges R by sending the message:
Si → R : [Encrypt(PKSi , (N ‖ t ‖ R ‖ Si), T )]
where N is a nonce.
3. R decrypts the previous message, increases N , and returns:
R→ Si : [Encrypt(PKR, (N + 1 ‖ t ‖ R ‖ Si), T )]
4. Si decrypts the received message and checks that N is correct. If so, it executes
c and sends back to R the response r(c) using the same access structure T :
Si → R : [Encrypt(PK, (Kr ‖ t), T ), EKr(r(c))]
In the case of a get() command, r(c) contains the information requested by R.
In the case of a set() command, r(c) may be a report about the execution or
just an ok/error message.
Note that this protocol implicitly assumes that R and Si can communicate di-
rectly, hence the R → Si and Si → R notation. In practice, the WBAN controller
will forward the message to the receiver using the appropriate signalling.
The command protocol is illustrated in Fig. 4.4.
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the main security properties of the protocols introduced
above and report experimental results about their efficiency obtained with a proto-
type implementation.
4.4.1 Security Analysis
4.4.1.1 Data Confidentiality and Access Control
Confidentiality refers to the protection of sensitive information from being disclosed
to unauthorized users. In our solution, we use a hybrid scheme, like the one used
in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), with the aim of guaranteeing confidentiality while
offering high efficiency. In the publish protocol presented above, session keys are pro-
tected through CP-ABE and then messages are symmetrically encrypted. Therefore,
the security guarantees offered by CP-ABE an the strength of symmetric ciphers like
AES or 3-DES allow us to claim that our solution do not put at risk confidentiality.
In our solution we offer a fine-grain access control through LBAC polices. Al-
though LBAC is less expressive than RBAC, in Section 4.3.1.1 we have shown how
using only AND connectives we are able to define a broad set of policies. In particu-
lar, we propose the combined used of security levels and compartments, which helps
us to provide wider expressibility despite being limited by using only one operator.
On the other hand, the use of compartments suits well the healthcare environment.
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accepting a publication. This can be done in a standard way and is not the focus
of this chapter.
4.4.1.4 Privacy within the WBAN
Untraceable communications are not one of our design goals in this chapter. Con-
sequently, it is possible for any entity with access to the bus to determine the iden-
tity of a sensor, when it publishes something, and even who is subscribed to what
service. Avoiding this may be certainly interesting in many scenarios. However,
anonymization measures are known to be quite expensive in traditional Wireless
Sensor Networks, so lightweight techniques suitable for a WBAN scenario would be
welcome.
4.4.2 Performance
We next analyse and evaluate the performance between traditional management and
our proposed protocol in terms of functionality, computation, communication and
storage overhead.
Comparing both traditional and ABE public key cryptography, one of the major
differences they present is related to key distribution. In traditional algorithms,
the computation overhead is proportional to the users the system has, i.e., O(n),
whereas in CP-ABE schemes the computational overhead usually tends to be O(1).
Moreover, there is another main difference between traditional and CP-ABE cryp-
tography in terms of data access: the party who decrypts private data. In traditional
system, this operation is made by a trusted party (e.g., the bus controller in our
case) before granting access to the final entity and then encrypt the ciphertext with
the user’s PK. This operation (encryption + decryption) increases the system’s
overhead, whereas in CP-ABE such a trusted party only stores-and-forward data.
Decryption will only be made if the user’s public attributes match with the access
tree included in the ciphertext.
We have developed a prototype of our proposed solution for Android-based de-
vices and run it on a Google Nexus 4 smartphone with a Qualcomm Snapdragon
S4 Pro APQ8064 processor and 2GB of RAM. To do this, we built an app that
uses a Java implementation of both symmetric encryption/decryption and CP-ABE
primitives as in our publish and command protocols. Android v.4.4.4 was used in
our tests. In a first round of experiments, we measured the time required by both
symmetric and CP-ABE primitives. Fig. 4.5 shows the time required by AES and
CP-ABE to encrypt/decrypt 1 MB. The figures were obtained by averaging the
result over 10 executions and show that encryption incurs little overhead. In par-
ticular, CP-ABE times are quite reasonable considering that in our solution sensors
only need to CP-ABE encrypt or decrypt when a new access token is required, which
is a relatively infrequent event. Furthermore, access tokens consists basically of an
AES key plus some metadata, which amounts to less than 1024 KB. Thus, CP-ABE
encryption and decryption of an access token take roughly 3 to 4 ms.
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Figure 4.5: Execution time: (a) AES; (b) CP-ABE.
4.4.3 Power Consumption
In battery-powered sensors, power consumption is major limitation and security
measures should not be very demanding in this regard. We have also measured the
power consumption incurred by our solution when used in an Android platform.
The experiments have been conducted by applying a battery of tests involving key
generation, encryption, and decryption operations. Our device was previously in-
strumented with AppScope [176], an energy metering framework based on moni-
toring kernel activity for Android. AppScope collects usage information from the
monitored device and estimates the consumption of each running application using
an energy model given by DevScope [88]. AppScope provides the amount of energy
consumed by an app in the form of several time series, each one associated with a
component of the device (CPU, Wi-Fi, cellular, touchscreen, etc.). We restrict our
measures to CPU for computations, as our tests do not have a graphical user inter-
face, do not require user interaction and, therefore, do not use any other component
(see Fig. 4.6).
Table 4.1 shows the results in terms of Joules per byte consumed by symmetric
and CP-ABE encryption/decryption. As before, the figures are averages obtained
over 10 executions. A noteworthy result is that CP-ABE operations are around
1000 times more costly than their symmetric counterpart. This is reasonable and
motivates designs like ours in which CP-ABE is only used to encrypt a symmetric
key. In order to contextualize the energy implications of the previous figures, we have
measured the power consumed by some popular apps during 10 minutes: watching
multimedia content in YouTube, playing a game (MX Moto), and online social
networking through Facebook (see Table 4.2). The amount of energy consumed
ranges between approximately 550 J and 645 J, most of it being related to the
graphical user interface.
66
4. Secure Publish-Subscribe Protocols for Heterogeneous Medical Wireless Body
Area Networks
Figure 4.6: Power consumption trace of the CP-ABE Setup(), KeyGen(), Encrypt(),
and Decrypt() methods in an Android app.
Primitive Energy per byte
AES-128/CTR/NoPadding Encryption/Decryption 7.62 · 10−9
CP-ABE Encryption 1.32 · 10−6
CP-ABE Decryption 1.01 · 10−6
Table 4.1: Consumption (in Joules per byte) of symmetric and CP-ABE crypto-
graphic primitives.
4.5 Related Work
WBANs can be grouped into two different categories depending on whether they
use an external device [3, 31, 63, 167] or not [17, 104, 107, 111, 141, 175]. The main
disadvantage of using an external device is that the patient need to wear it at all
times. This increases the chances of it being stolen or lost, which could result in
a compromise of all personal data stored on it. Thus, many research works have
focused on schemes that do not rely on any external device. This architectures
present two main challenges: how data is encrypted and how users can access data.
The interested reader can find more information about WBANs in [4].
Bourbakis et al. have recently proposed in [30] a mobile health platform for
secure information exchange in wearable health monitoring systems. The scheme
incorporates various biometric authentication systems that are used to grant access
to encrypted health data. Thus, the system incorporates authentication, authoriza-
tion, confidentiality, and integrity services. Contrarily to our approach, the system
in [30] is based on symmetric cryptographic primitives.
Barua et al. [17] proposed a scheme to control access to a patient’s health in-
67
4. Secure Publish-Subscribe Protocols for Heterogeneous Medical Wireless Body
Area Networks
App CPU Comms Display Total
YouTube 30.11 12.59 508.90 551.59
MX Moto 129.24 5.75 509.54 644.52
Facebook 137.76 27.42 471.42 637.27
Table 4.2: Consumption (in Joules) of three popular apps during a time span of
10 minutes.
formation using different privacy levels. To do so, the authors use ABE in a rather
standard way: privileges are mapped into roles, and roles into ABE access struc-
tures. Additionally, a cloud-based storage is used to reduce the cost and to allow
data to be online anytime and anywhere. However, data is sent to the hospital
server before storing a copy in the cloud. The hospital server becomes a bottleneck
in this scheme, and no data is sent to the cloud if the server is down.
A similar protocol was presented by Akinyele et al. in [3]. The protocol uses
ABE to generate self-protecting EHRs, which can either be stored on cloud servers
or on cellphones so that they could be accessed when the health provider is offline.
Their solution is based on how personal health records are managed by the patients
themselves using their mobile devices. The schemes involves a large number of
messages exchanged between users and healthcare systems, and it is required the
existence of a single trusted authority that can decrypt all EHRs. This creates a
single point of failure, as the entire system would suffer a major privacy breach if
this party is compromised.
In [31], the authors describe a prototype of a cloud mobile health monitoring
system based on a WBAN and a smartphone. A neural network located as a cloud
service is used to determine whether the patient is in danger. The scheme does not
take into account the patient’s privacy at any point, neither in the WBAN nor in
the cloud, which makes it at least questionable that its applicability in real-world
scenarios.
Yi et al. proposed in [175] a new protocol in which each sensor stores three
different keys that are used to authenticate against three different data servers. If a
third party wants access to the patient’s data, it needs to obtain authorization from
those three data servers.
Another work that uses a cloud server to reduce the decryption computation
involved in Identity Based Cryptography (IBE) is the cloud-assisted mHealth mon-
itoring system [107]. This scheme consists of four main components: the cloud
server, a company which provides the mHealth monitoring service, patients, and a
trust authority. As pointed out in [49], this work does not take into account the
energy constraints of sensors and the real-time requirements of this kind of applica-
tions.
Many recent works have focused on the problem of controlling access to specific
data and assigning privileges to authorized users [104, 111, 141, 178]. In [111], a
WBAN is proposed to collect a large amount of data generated by medical sensor
networks. The system makes use of a scalable cloud-based infrastructure to store
and access the generated data in a secure way. In this work, the authors use CP-
ABE and symmetric encryption to achieve fine-grained access with low computation
68
4. Secure Publish-Subscribe Protocols for Heterogeneous Medical Wireless Body
Area Networks
overhead. A similar concept is proposed in [95], although in this work the authors
share devices instead of data like in [111].
Another work based on CP-ASBE (which is an improved form of CP-ABE by
introducing a recursive set-based structure on attributes associated with user keys)
was presented in [141]. In this work, authors proposed a scheme called CRYPE in
order to guarantee the security and privacy of patients when somebody access data
that has been previously stored in the cloud. Additionally, IBE is used for secure
end-to-end communications. It is claimed that this protocol provides confidentiality,
role-base access control with user revocation, scalability, flexibility, and prevention
of active attacks such as DoS, and chosen ciphertext and plaintext attacks.
Li et al. proposed an attribute revocation method for Multi-Authority Attribute
Based Encryption (MA-ABE) systems in [104] to reduce the overhead of key man-
agement. This means that the system is split in multiple security domains, each of
which manages a subset of users. However this scheme has two main issues: (i) It
is only suitable for KP-ABE systems [168]; and (ii) It is a must that each patient
generates and distributes her own security keys to the authorized users [111].
A work similar to ours is [75], which focuses on securing the communications
between BAN sensors and external users using CP-ABE. Contrarily to our publish-
subscribe architecture, the work in [75] takes a data-centric approach in which a
data sink receives data from all sensors. Furthermore, sensors can only encrypt and,
therefore, cannot access data produced by another sensor.
The proliferation of networked WBAN medical devices has stimulated research
on efficient architectures for cryptographic services. For example, the work in [151]
proposes a system architecture for implantable devices where security and medical
functionalities are decoupled by running then onto two separate cores. The CP-
ABE cryptosystem used in our work [69] constitutes another example of lightweight
scheme designed on-purpose to be embedded on mobile and wearable devices. Other
works in this line include the SCAN secure processor [89], which supporting biomet-
ric authentication and various symmetric encryption primitives.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced a publish-subscribe architecture for WBANs
with particular emphasis in medical applications. In this domain, medical sensors
producing highly sensitive information will likely coexist with devices intended for
other purposes, such as sport or entertainment apps. We leverage the versatility
offered by CP-ABE primitives to propose protocols that allow sensors to subscribe
to the data feeds published by other sensors. The privileges required to access each
particular data are set by the sensor’s policy, who can vary them depending on the
context. Apps and external users (e.g., healthcare staff) can get access to such data
feeds and also reconfigure or request specific data from the sensors provided that they
have sufficient privileges to do so. Our implementation of the underlying protocols
make use of a recently proposed lightweight CP-ABE scheme. As consequence of
this, the entities use a constant size decryption key which is independent of the
used attributes. On the other hand, our scheme offers a fine-grained access control
through LBAC policies that are limited to using AND operations only. Finally, it
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is worth mentioning that the proposed Publish and Command protocols facilitate
to model the principal interactions in a WBAN composed of a variable number of
devices.
Our experimental results confirm that the scheme is suitable for most current
sensors, including ARM-based platforms.
70
5
Decentralised Ciphertext
Attribute-Based Encryption with
Keyword Search
5.1 Introduction
E-Health is a modern healthcare system that employs technology to increase pa-
tients’ experience of healthcare assistance. For example, ePrescribing allows pa-
tients to access, print and even to electronically transmit prescriptions from doctors
to pharmacists, while Telemedicine provides physical and psychological remote diag-
nosis and treatments. Besides multiple advantages, e-Health is affected by inevitable
privacy issues related to data storage, processing and analysis [27, 34]. E-Health de-
ployment relies on sensors which can communicate via wireless channels and share
healthcare data. The collection of sensors worn on, in or around the human (body
with the sole purpose of monitoring biological signals in real-time) generates the so
called WBAN. Since sensors are generally resource-constrained devices, the sensitive
collected data needs to be stored on an external, usually not fully trusted, database
called cloud server.
Recent works [102, 96, 157, 180] have propose to combine ABE and Searchable
Encryption (SE) with the two fold aim of storing encrypted data on semi-honest
servers and later on letting authorized users perform encrypted keyword queries on
encrypted data. The resulting schemes do not require decryption in order to perform
keyword-search, and so avoid the server to get any knowledge on the data or on
the queries. Although the afore mentioned schemes provide desirable features (the
combination of ABE with SE), all proposals are either based on the very limiting
assumption that there exists a single Trusted Authority (TA) controlling all the
attributes [180, 96, 157], or allow multiple authorities coordinated by a central
entity like in [102]. Lewko [100] was the first to remove the TA and proposed a
decentralized ABE scheme. In this chapter, we follow Lewko’s footprints and provide
a new decentralized schema named Decentralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based
Searchable Encryption (DCP-ABSE) without TA. More precisely, in our model there
is no hierarchy among the authorities.
Table 5.1 depicts a quick comparison between our proposed scheme and other
related works on combining attribute-based encryption and searchable encryption.
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no-CA MA no-TA SE ABE
[157] X X X X KP-ABE
[96] X X X X CP-ABE
VABKS [180] X X X X CP-ABE / KP-ABE
ARMS [102] X X X X CP-ABE
Lewko [100] X X X X CP-ABE
our model X X X X CP-ABE
CA: Central Authority, MA: Multiple Authorities, TA: Trusted Authority, SE:
Searchable Encryption
Table 5.1: Comparison of ABSE schemes
Our contributions In this work we will use the publish-subscribe scheme pre-
sented in [137] as a starting point to solve the aforementioned questions and we will
add some extra features. The purpose of this chapter is threefold:
• We solve the DCP-ABE main issues by adapting the original proposal to a De-
centralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (DCP-ABSE) pre-
sented in [100];
• We introduce a new scheme for attribute based encryption with keyword search
based on the union of ABE and SE. In our scheme, a user can query data
related to a keyword in the form of tokens, the server will return the ciphertexts
that match the queried keyword if and only if the access policy of the query
satisfies the access policy of the search determined by the data owner. Finally,
the correct decryption of the data retrieved by the user is possible only when
the user’s attributes satisfy the encryption policy stated by the data owner.
Our DCP-ABSE scheme let the data owner specify two (possibly different)
policies, one for data decryption and one for keyword search.
• We prove our DCP-ABSE scheme to be resilient against a semi-honest-but-
curious server.
• We do not lose any of the original properties presented in [137], including that
devices need only to decrypt, the publish-subscribe operation to create and
access data feeds, or support for LBAC policies.
• We test the performance of our proposed scheme on different devices including
smartphones and ARM-based architectures.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which implements a complete
solution based on a decentralized attribute based encryption with keyword search in
the context of e-Health systems where two different access policies must be satisfied,
one to perform the query and another one to decrypt the data stored in the database.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows. Firstly, we present some cryp-
tographic definitions to understand how the architecture works and how it is going
to be improved (refer to Section 5.2). Secondly, we sum up the current proposals
done in this area (Section 5.3). After that the core of our proposal named Decen-
tralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Searchable Encryption (refer to Section
5.4) is proposed and the security analysis can be seen in Section 5.5. This chapter
ends with the evaluation of the implemented model (refer to Section 5.6) and some
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conclusions (refer to Section 5.7).
5.2 Preliminaries
For completeness and readability, this section collects a brief overview of the cryp-
tographic primitives and security assumptions used throughout the chapter.
5.2.1 Access Structure
Let we denote by U the attribute universe description and by A a collection of
attributes A1,A2, . . . ,An, with Ai ∈ {0, 1}. A is an access structure over U given by
a collection of non-empty subsets of U, where the sets specified by A are called the
authorized sets.
5.2.2 Bilinear Pairings
Let p be a (large) prime number, G be a multiplicative cyclic group order p and g
be a generator of G. A bilinear map e is a function e : G×G→ GT satisfying the
following properties:
1. Bilinear: ∀u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp; we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1 (identity element of GT ).
3. Efficient: there exists an efficient algorithm to calculate e(u, v), ∀u, v ∈ G.
4. Symmetric: e is symmetric, i.e., e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga).
The map e is also called bilinear-pairing, as it takes as pair of elements ((u, v) ∈ G2)
and returns a single value e(u, v) ∈ GT .
5.2.3 Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes
Definition 1. A Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) Π over a set of parties P is called
Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) over Zp if:
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There exists a matrix A (called the share-generating matrix for Π) where for
all x = 1, · · · , l, the x− th row of A is labelled by a party ρ(x) (ρ is a function
from {1, · · · , l} to P). When we consider the column vector υ = (s, r2, · · · , rn),
where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and r2, · · · , rn ∈ Zp are randomly
chosen, then Aυ is the vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π. The
share (Aυ)x belongs to party ρ(x).
Following the construction given in [100], for the composite order group con-
struction, LSSS matrices over ZN are used, where N = p1p2p3 is a product of three
distinct primes. As in the definition above over Zp, a set S is authorized if the rows
of the access matrix A labeled by elements in S have the vector (1, 0, · · · , 0) in their
span modulo N .
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5.2.4 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption
Definition 2. Let G be a group of prime order p and g be a generator where |p| is
proportional to the security parameter λ. There exists a negligible function υ such
that for any adversary A, given G, p, g, ga, gb, gc and bilinear map e for randomly
chosen a, b, c ∈ Zp, A can distinguish e(g, g)abc from e(g, g)R for random R ∈ Zp
with probability at most υ(λ).
5.2.5 Hardness Assumptions.
In what follows, we consider a group GN of composite order N = p1p2p3 (product
of three distinct primes), and a group Gp1 of order p1. Furthermore, we will use an
efficiently computable, non-degenerate symmetric bilinear map e : Gp1×Gp1 ← GN .
Problem 1. Given a bilinear group generator G, define the following distribution:
G = (N = p1p2p3, G,GT , e)←$ GG,
g1 ←$ Gp1 , D = (G, g1),
T1 ←$ G, T2 ←$ Gp1
Assumption 1. We assume the subgroup decision Problem to be hard in the consid-
ered groups, i.e., that any efficient computable algorithm, an adversary A has only
negligible advantage in breaking Problem 1:
AdvG,A(λ) := |Prob[A(D,T1) = 1]− Prob[A(D,T2) = 1]| .
5.3 Background and Related Work
5.3.1 Attribute Based Encryption
Attribute based encryption was firstly presented by Sahai and Waters in [145] as a
type of public cryptography technique where messages are encrypted with both a
private key and some user’s public attributes. On the other hand, decryption can
be run by everyone whose attributes satisfy the policy set during encryption. This
technique has become nowadays one of the most interesting cryptographic ways to
grant access to data [103].
There are four main categories in ABE: 1) KP-ABE [66]; 2) Non-monotonic ABE
[125]; 3) HABE [158]; and 4) CP-ABE [24]. In KP-ABE systems, owners are not
able to choose who will decrypt messages. Non-monotonic ABE has overhead prob-
lems because of negative clauses and thus makes it unfeasible to be deployed in
constrained devices. HABE systems are, as far as we know, unsuitable for most
current real systems since they assume that all attributes in one conjunctive clause
may be managed by the same authority, and therefore the same attribute cannot
be managed by multiple authorities. Finally, CP-ABE systems have high computa-
tional cost in the decryption algorithm because of the number of public attributes
which make the policy tree unmanageable. However, recent advances have demon-
strated that even some lightweight devices, such as RFID labels, can implement
ABE decryption [69].
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5.3.2 Privacy-Preserving Processing and ABE
A central challenge in the last years is to construct access-control protocols that suite
resource constrained devices, i.e., that have low computation and storage overhead
and ABE cryptography is a real candidate [103]. Classical proposals [100] have a
privacy leakage in terms of public attributes: the TA always knows who is joining
the network. The main enabler of this leakage of private information is the key
generation algorithm in CP-ABE schemes. In the large majority of the proposals,
KeyGen algorithm is run by a trusted authority, who thus has access to the public
attributes of each new entity without any restrictions.
Guo et al. [70] proposed PAAS, a Privacy Preserving Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion (PP-ABE) scheme based on four different levels of privacy requirements: 1)
authenticated users can check the validity of the attributes without compromising
the privacy of the users; 2) both the users’ credentials and the values of attributes,
can be checked; 3) only a set of public attributes are revealed; 4) in this level, only
the size of the intersection of both public attributes and the mobile patients are
revealed. As has been pointed out in [146], despite solving the privacy issues this
protocol suffers from both cost and communication overheads.
Tong et al. [154] attempt to solve the privacy-preservation problem on cloud
systems based on ABE and Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE). Contrarily
to our proposal, Tong et al.’s protocol employs ABE to encrypt the secret shares
used to generate valid signatures instead of encrypting users health data, which is
encrypted by using apparently random identifiers to secure index and symmetric
cryptography.
To fight against such a privacy leakage, Chase proposed in 2007 a MA-ABE
scheme in [38] to reduce the trust on the central authority and allow cooperation
between authorities to initialize the system. Later on, Lewko and Waters presented
[100] a multi-authority attribute-based scheme called Decentralized Ciphertext Pol-
icy Attribute Based Encryption (DCP-ABE) as an improvement of Chase’s protocol,
where a central authority is not needed and authorities can work independently.
5.3.3 Searchable Encryption
Searchable encryption is a cryptographic primitive that solves the problem of search-
ing over encrypted data without decrypting the ciphertext. There are two different
types of searchable encryption. In private-key searchable encryption schemes, both
the data and any other additional data structures are encrypted, so that only users
with the private key can access it. In the case of public-key searchable encryption,
the encryptor can generate trapdoors to test if some words are in the ciphertext.
Public Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) was originally proposed by
Boneh et al. in [29] and it is considered to be the reference scheme in public-key
searchable encryption. PEKS allows senders to store encrypted data on a public
server where some keywords are encrypted and attached with the receiver’s public
key. Additionally, the receiver may send a trapdoor to the server, which is another
key based on her own private key, to perform keywords queries without revealing
anything about the data or the keywords.
The classical PEKS scheme consists of the following algorithms:
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• KeyGen(λ): This method takes a security parameter λ and outputs a pub-
lic/secret key pair Apub, Apriv.
• Tag(Apub,W ): This method takes Apub and a keywordW as input and outputs
a searchable encryption of W , SW . It is run by the sender.
• Trapdoor(Apriv, W ): This method takes both Apriv and a keywordW as input
and outputs a trapdoor TW . It is run by the receiver.
• Test(Apub, SW , TW ): This method takes three parameters: Apub, SW , and TW
as input, and outputs True if the query matches, that is if the given keyword
is in the ciphertext and False otherwise.
The main purpose of PEKS is to avoid the honest-but-curious server to be able
to learn anything else. However, in the original proposal, a secure channel is needed.
For that reason, Baek et al. in [16] proposed an efficient secure channel scheme by
providing keyword search in the random oracle model. Some time later, Fang et al.
[56] improved this proposal in avoiding both secure channels and the use of random
oracles.
Most of the searchable encryption proposals need the owner to share a secret
key with a set of authorized users or to generate a trapdoor [153]. For that reason,
a new cryptographic primitive based on ABE and SE, which we name Attribute
Based Searchable Encryption (ABSE) has been proposed recently [96, 157]. The
main purpose of ABSE protocols is to allow users to establish a policy not only for
data access and to perform encrypted queries looking for a given set of keywords
over some encrypted data. As a result, no interaction between data and the server
is taking place and thus the semi-honest server is not able to find out the searched
keywords. Existing ABSE schemes, however, use a different approach than what
we propose in this chapter and additionally [96, 157] do not provide any test of the
performances of their schemes on resource constrained devices.
Zheng et al. have recently proposed a new ABSE scheme called Verifiable
Attribute-based Keyword Search (VABKS) [180], where a set of keywords are de-
fined by the owner, linked to the data, and then stored in an external cloud server.
When some user wants to search for a given keyword, she has to retrieve both a
public key and a private key from the authority to build the token for that keyword.
Once the token is generated, the user sends it to the database which will eventu-
ally answer with the search result if and only if the user satisfies the access policy
contained in the token.
5.4 Decentralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based
Searchable Encryption
In this section, we first introduce the architectural model (Section 5.4.1) and an
abstract description of our protocol (Section 5.4.2). Finally, we present a thorough
definition of our novel DCP-ABSE scheme (Section 5.4.3).
5.4.1 Architecture
We next describe all entities that take part in our model.
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Authorities. These are the entities that directly deal with the policy attributes.
The main duty of an authority is to associate attributes to keys and distribute
the keys to users. We assume that any two different authorities do not share
any common attribute (i.e., one attribute belongs to only one authority). On
one hand, all authorities collaborate to create the secret and public master
keys used later on in the searchable phase. On the other hand, each author-
ity alone generates both the secret and the public keys for a given attribute
possessed by the authority. The users’ keys (one to encrypt the data and the
other to encrypt the keywords) are generated by the authorities separately
and according to the attributes the user has. In our system, the authorities
can be managed by external sources such as hospitals, governments, or private
companies. Communications between authorities are assumed to be secure.
Furthermore, our model allows any (non-compromised) authority to leave the
network at any time without re-initializing the whole system. Similarly, no
re-initialization is needed if a new authority joins the system, assuming that
there is a secure way to send the (already produced) secret master key to the
new authority.
Cloud server. Our model includes an external cloud server where user’s data are
stored (outsourced). This has become a common setting for multiple benefi-
cial reasons such as reduced costs, improved manageability, high availability,
number of sharing resources and/or scalability. The cloud server is considered
to be semi-honest (i.e., honest-but-curious) which means that it is assumed
to always follow the protocol as specified but tries to learn more information
from the protocol execution transcript. The main purpose of the cloud server
is to store and allow encrypted queries over the encrypted data.
Users. In our system, users can be classified into two main roles: data owners and
common users. As owners, they perform the attribute-based encryption of
their own data using their private key. As users, they can perform (attribute-
based) queries on the data and decrypt in case the user’s attributes satisfy the
policy. In our application scenario, users include healthcare staff, researchers,
etc., whereas data owners are users with a WBAN who produce, encrypt and
send data to the cloud for storage.
5.4.2 Protocol Description
We next present a motivating framework for DCP-ABSE and provide an overview
of its algorithms. Figure 5.1 depicts the intended setting for our proposal. The four
phases highlighted in Figure 5.1 correspond to the main steps of the protocol:
Phase I (WBAN operation): The data owner has multiple sensors that form the
WBAN as well as a hub device (e.g., a smartphone) that acts as WBAN
controller. The controller can communicate with the sensors to retrieve the
data measured by the sensors using, for example, a protocol such as the one
described in [137]. In the following, we will often identify the controller with
the data owner.
Phase II (Key distribution): In this phase, the authorities distribute the public
keys for each attribute they possess. Moreover, upon the users’ request, each
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WBAN DataBase
CT ||CKW
CT ||CKW
Search(GP,PMK,CKW,TknQ)
AuthorityN
KeyGen(GP, SMK, SK,GID, atti)
USKGID,att
AuthoritySetup(GP)
USKGID,att
{CT }
SmartPhone UserN
KeyGen(GP, SMK, SK,GID, atti)
USKGID,att TokenGen(GP,USK, (Query,Policy))
Figure 5.3: Usage of the various subprotocols in DCP-ABSE.
5.4.3 Protocol Design
We describe our proposed scheme CP-ABE that combines ABE and SE in a novel
way. More precisely, our protocol enables data-owners to encrypt data under a
chosen policy and it also allows users to perform keyword search on the encrypted
data in a decentralised context.
• GlobalSetup(λ) → GP
This algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and uses it to generate
a group GN of composite order N = p1p2p3 (satisfying Assumption 1). As
a second step, a random element of Gp1r{1Gp1} is chosen, namely g1 ∈ G∗p1 .
Eventually the algorithm fixes a bilinear map e : Gp1 × Gp1 → GN and three
hash functions: H : {0, 1}∗ −→ Gp1 , H1 : Atts −→ GN and H2 : {0, 1}∗ −→
Zp1 . The set of (public) global parameters is: GP= {g1, N ,Gp1 ,GN , e, H, H1,
H2}.
• MasterKeyGen(GP) → (SMK, PMK)
This method requires all the authorities of the system to collaborate in a SMPC
protocol and jointly generate a pair of master keys (one secret, known to all
authorities, and one made public to be used by the users of the system). The
algorithm proceeds as follows: each authority Authj, for j = 1, . . . , n generates
three random numbers rj, sj, tj ←$ Zp1 . Then the numbers are shared with the
other authorities using a SSS, e.g., in order to share rj, Authj elects n − 1
random numbers ρj,i ←$ Zp1 , and sets ρj,n = rj −
∑n−1
i=1 ρj,i. From the shares
ρ1,j, . . . ρn,j, Authj can compute the partial result ρj and use it (together with
the other authorities) to compute the final value R = ∑nj=1 rj mod p1. Via
the same procedure, the authorities can compute S = ∑nj=1 sj mod p1 and
T = ∑nj=1 tj mod p1. The secret master key is SMK={R, S, T} while the
public master key is PMK={gR1 , gS1 , gT1 }.
• AuthoritySetup(GP) → (SK, PK)
In this step, each authority generates its own secret key and public key inde-
pendently from the other authorities. To do so, for each attribute atti ∈ Atts
belonging to Authj, it chooses a pair of random numbers αi, βi ←$ Zp1 . The
public key of authority Authj will thus be composed of PK={(e(g1, g1)αi , gβi1 ),
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∀ i ∈ Authj} while the secret key will simply be the collection SK={(αi, βi),
∀ i ∈ Authj}.
• KeyGen(GP, SMK, SK, GID, atti) → (USKABEGID,atti , UMKSEGID)
The (secret) key for attribute atti (possessed by the user and by Authj) is
generated as follows. The user provides her Global IDentifier (GID) and the
attribute atti to Authj. The authority (using the secret key SK) returns to
the user two values, gαi1 H(GID)βi for encryption and {gH2(GID)1 H1(atti)di ,gdi1 }
to perform keywords search. In order for the user to do keyword search,
each Authj computes gid = H2(GID) ∈ Zp1 , generates random di and returns
USKGID,atti = {gαi1 H(GID)βi , ggid1 H1(atti)di , gdi1 } and UMKSEGID=g
RT−gid
S
1 , is in-
dependent of the attribute and shall be the same for each authority.
• Encrypt(GP, PK, (Message, Policy))→ CT
Let M ∈ Gnp1 be the message (a vector) to be encrypted, and let us repre-
sent the Policy as a pair (A, piA), where A is the rows(A) × cols(A) access
matrix, and piA : {1, . . . , rows(A)} −→ Atts is a function to map the rows
of A to attributes. The x-th row of A will be denoted as Ax ∈ {0, 1}cols(A).
Resembling the scheme in [100], in order to encrypt M according to (A, piA),
the user needs to first construct two random vectors v and w with the fol-
lowing properties. Vector v = (v0, . . . , vl−1)t ←$ Zcols(A)N is a random vector,
while w = (0, w1, . . . , wl−1)t ∈ Zcols(A)N with w1, . . . , wl−1 ←$ ZN . Let υx denote
Ax · v ∈ ZN , similarly let ωx = Ax · w ∈ ZN . For each row Ax, the user gets a
random number zx ←$ ZN . Eventually, the components of the ciphertext are
computed as (∀x ∈ {1, . . . , rows(A)}):
C0 = M · e(g1, g1)v0 ,
C1,x =
(
e(g1, g1)αpiA(x)
)zx
e(g1, g1)υx ,
C2,x = gzx1 ,
C3,x =
(
g
ypiA(x)
1
)zx
gωx1
and CT =
(
C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x}rows(A)x=1
)
.
• EncyptKeyword(GP,PMK, (Keyword, Policy))→ CKW
Initially the Keyword is mapped into a group element, using the hash function,
i.e., H(Keyword) = h ∈ Gp1 . Then the ‘keyword’ is encrypted according to the
Policy (P, pip) and the public master key PMK. The following algorithm is an
adjustment of Zheng et al.’s scheme [180] when the access policy is expressed
as an LSSS matrix:
The user generates two random integers: a, b ←$ Zp1 . In order to produce
shares of b for each row Px in P (x = 1, . . . , rows(P )) the data owner will pick
a random vector v ∈ Zcols(P )−1p1 and compute the values bx = Px · (b, v)t ∈ Zp1 .
Finally, the encrypted keyword is produced (∀ x ∈ {1, . . . , rows(P )}):
ckw1 = (gT1 )a,
ckw2 = (gR1 )(a+b)(gS1 )ha,
ckw3 = (gS1 )b,
Wx = gbx1 ,
W ′x = H1(piP (x))bx
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and CKW=
(
ckw1,ckw2,ckw3,{Wx,W ′x}rows(P )x=1 , (P, piP )
)
.
• TokenGen(GP,UMKSEGID, (Query, Policy))→ TknKW
Let Policy=(Q, pi) and let q ∈ Gp1 denote the image of the Query∈ {0, 1}∗
via the hash function q = H(Query) ∈ Gp1 . The user then picks rows(Q) + 1
random values c, d1, . . . , drows(Q) ←$ Zp1 and generates the token entries as
(∀x = 1, . . . , rows(Q)):
tok1 = ((gR1 )(gS1 )q)c,
tok2 = (gT1 )c,
tok3 = (UMKSEGID)c,
Vx = (ggid1 H1(piQ(x))dx)c,
V ′x = (gdx1 )c
The final token is:
TknKW =
(
tok1, tok2, tok3, {Vx, V ′x}rows(Q)x=1 , (Q, piQ)
)
.
• Search(GP,PMK,CKW , TknKW )→ CT
As a first step, Search looks for a subset of attributes B ⊆ {piQ(1), . . . , piQ
(rows(Q))} ⊆ Atts that satisfies the policy (P, piP ) present in CKW . If such a
B does not exist, Search returns ⊥. Otherwise, for each attribute attx ∈ B,
it computes Eattx = e(Vx,Wx)e(V ′x,W ′x) = e(g1, g1)
bx c gid. In order to reconstruct the
randomness b from the shares bx, it computes the |B| coefficients cx ∈ Zp1 of
the linear combination of rows of Q that satisfies ∑x cxQx = (1, 0, . . . , 0). The
value b is retrieved via the formula: ∏x (Eattx)cx = e(g1, g1)b c gid. Eventually,
Search returns the cihertexts CT , that are connected to the queried keyword
and for which it holds:
e(ckw2, tok2) = e(ckw1, tok1)e(g1, g1)b c gide(ckw3, tok3) .
If there is no data satisfying the previous equality, the algorithm outputs ⊥.
• Decrypt(GP,USKABEGID,atti , CT )→ Message
This method computes Message ∈ Gp1 from CT . In order for the decryption
to work correctly, the user key USKABEGID,atti has to contain the attributes that
satisfy the policy under which CT has been encrypted. The user calculates
C1,x · e(H(GID), C3,x)
e(USKGID,piA(x), C2,x)
= e(g1, g1)λxe(H(GID), g1)ωx
for each x ∈ S ⊆ {1, . . . , rows(A)}, the subset of attribute satisfying the policy
(A, piA). As the user satisfies the policy, then there exist constants cx ∈ ZN
for which ∑x cxAx = (1, 0, · · · , 0). 1 The values cx are then used to retrieve
v0 from the shares υx as follows: e(g1, g1)v0 =
∏
x
(e(g1, g1)υxe(H(GID), g1)ωx)cx .
Finally, M = C0/e(g1, g1)v0 .
1The cx are the coefficient of the linear combination of rows of A that generate (1,0,. . . ,0) and
thus satisfy the policy.
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Correctness. The decryption of an encrypted message (with matching policies)
always returns the plaintext.
It is easy to see that the proposed DCP-ABSE scheme si correct, the proof reduces
almost immediately to the correctness of the ABE scheme in [100] and the keyword-
search scheme in [180].
Soundness. A user whose attributes do not satisfy the policy of the ciphertext
(resp. query) shall not be able to decrypt correctly (resp. obtain a result other than
⊥ from Search).
The soundness property follows directly from the soundness of the two base schemes
we combine in DCP-ABSE.
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section we first describe the adversary model and the security model for our
proposal in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.3, respectively.
5.5.1 Adversarial Model
Similarly to the initial schemes [100, 180] we consider an honest-but-curious adver-
sary A who essentially performs chosen-plaintext attacks. In the games, we do not
let A to corrupt authorities, however our DCP-ABSE scheme is resilient to a static
corruption of authorities. The only leakage that comes, is the possibility to generate
token queries for any GID of the adversary’s choice. We model A as a Probabilistic
Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithm, and define two security games:
1. CPA against message encryption (Game 1)
2. CPA against keyword search (Game 2)
The aim of game 1 is to show that A cannot exploit keyword search in order to break
the ABE scheme used for message encryption. Symmetrically, game 2 captures the
scenario in which A tries to exploit the ABE scheme in order to break the security
of the keyword search. After we prove the security for the two games, our model
is secure because we can reduce the attacks against DCP-ABSE to attacks against
the schemes [100] and [180] separately.
5.5.2 Leakage of Information from Keyword Search on En-
crypted Data
In a real world scenario keywords are related to the content of the (plaintext) data
returned by Search. For instance, if an attacker produces a token query for the key-
word ‘blood pressure’, she expects that the returned ciphertext encrypts values be-
tween 50 and 200 with high probability. This fact obviously leads to a non-negligible
advantage in breaking the semantic security of the ABE encryption scheme. To de-
fend against the leakage of information derived by the keyword search is a direction
of independent interests which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Despite sev-
eral proposals [16, 56, 62, 149], to the best of the authors’ knowledge it is still an
open question how to reduce the amount information leaked by searchable encryp-
tion schemes in public key scenarios. More precisely, it has been shown [85, 150]
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that public-key cryptography alone cannot protect against keyword guessing at-
tacks. Since our DCP-ABSE scheme is built to enable clients to perform keyword
search on encrypted data in a public way, we cannot guarantee perfect secrecy for
the encryption. Nevertheless, our construction prevents an adversary from deduc-
ing any information about the keyword, given keyword ciphertexts (i.e., without
allowing any matched search tokens). In other words, we guarantee that A cannot
distinguish the encryption of two keywords, which makes DCP-ABSE search secure
against passive adversaries.
5.5.3 Security Model
We define the security for out DCP-ABSE according to the following two games,
between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Game 1 (CPA against message encryption).
Setup The global setup algorithm Setup is run and the output (GP ) is used as
input in MasterKeyGen method. All public parameters are given to A.
Key Query Phase 1 The adversary makes user key queries to the challenger.
More precisely, A submits queries of the form (atti,GID) for an attribute atti
and an identity GID (both can variate with the query). The challenger adds
the query to a list L (initially empty) and returns the user’s key: (USKABEGID,atti ,
UMKSEGID)← KeyGen(SMK,SK,GID, atti).
Challenge Phase The attacker specifies two messages, M0 and M1, and two ac-
cess policies (A, piA) and (P, piP ). A can select (P, piP ) freely, while (A, piA) has
to satisfy the following constraint: among the elements in L, for any identity
GID, the set of queried attributes atti shall not satisfy the policy (A, piA). The
challenger then selects a random keyword KW and encrypts it under (P, piP ),
obtaining ckw, also C flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts the mes-
sage Mβ under access matrix (A, piA). Finally, C returns to A the ciphertexts
(CT , ckw).
Query Phase 2 The adversary is allowed to perform keyword queries like in Phase
1 as long as the pairs (atti,GID) satisfy the constraints set in the Challenge
Phase. In addition, A can perform keyword search queries, by submitting to
C tokens TknKW . The challenger runs the Search algorithm and returns to
A the output corresponding to TknKW .
Guess The attacker outputs a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} for β. A is said to win the game if
β′ = β and the advantage is defined as: AdvCPA+KS(A) = |Prob[β′ = β]− 12 |.
Note that Game 1 is modified with respect to what would be the standard CPA
against DCP-ABSE, in particular we make the challenger choose a random keyword
to associate to the challenge ciphertext. We have already discussed in 5.5.2 that
otherwise we cannot prevent the leakage of some information derived from keyword
search.
Theorem 1. The DCP-ABSE scheme is secure with respect to the CPA against
message encryption described in Game 1.
Proof. We prove that an adversaryA has negligible advantage in Game 1 by showing
that the keyword search (in the query phase 2) leaks no useful information to A.
Subsequently, we compare A with an adversary B involved in the CPA game against
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the ABE scheme proposed by Lewko [100]. Since the CPA game in [100] coincides
with the Game 1 a part in query phase 2, in as much A is allowed to perform token
queries, it is easy to see that:
AdvGame 1[A] ≤ AdvGame in [100][B] + negl.
By the security of Lewko’s ABE scheme [100] we have that AdvGame 1[A] is negligible.
Which proves the statement.
What is left to prove is the initial step: A gains no considerable advantage
by performing keyword search in query phase 2. This is true because of how the
challenger picks the keyword to associate to the challenge ciphertext. Since the
keyword KW associated to Encrypt(GP, PK, (Mβ, (A, piA)) is chosen at random, a
search that matches ckw (the encryption of KW ) does not assure that the plaintext
of the returned result is somehow related to KW . In query phase 2, if A submits
tokens that do not match ckw the returned result will be ⊥, so no information is
leaked about challenge the ciphertext/plaintex. On the other hand, if the adversary
submits a token that matches ckw, A would receive back the challenge ciphertext
CT . However, KW is independent of the plaintext of CT by construction, which
implies that guessing KW does not give any advantage in breaking the semantic
security of the ABE scheme.
Game 2 (CPA against keyword search).
Setup The global setup algorithm Setup is run and the output (GP ) is used as
input in MasterKeyGen. All public parameters are given to A.
Key Query Phase 1 The adversary makes user key queries to the challenger.
More precisely, A submits queries of the form (atti,GID) for an attribute atti
and an identity GID (both can variate with the query). The challenger adds
the query to a list L (initially empty) and checks if, for the identity GID, the
queried attributes satisfy policy Q∗. If so, C returns ⊥, otherwise C sends to
A the user’s key: (USKABEGID,atti , UMKSEGID)← KeyGen(SMK,SK,GID, atti).
Challenge Phase The attacker specifies two keywords, KW0 and KW1, and an
access policy (P, piP ) satisfying the following constraint: among the elements
in L, for any identity GID, the set of queried attributes atti shall not satisfy
the policy (P, piP ). The challenger flips two random coins α, β ∈ {0, 1} and
proceed as follows. First C produces the challenge encrypted keyword ckw that
encryptsKWβ under policy (P, piP ). Then, C generates a token Tkn fromKWα
and the policy (P, piP ) and runs the Search algorithm on the encryption of
KWα under (P, piP ) and TknKW . Let CT denote the result of the Search (i.e.,
CT is the ciphertext linked to KWα under policy (P, piP )). The challenger
returns to A the encrypted pair (CT , ckw ).
Query Phase 2 The adversary is allowed to perform keyword queries like in Phase
1 as long as the pairs (atti,GID) satisfies the constraints set in the Challenge
Phase. A can also perform keyword search queries, by submitting to C tokens
TknKW . In case TknKW is a token forKW0 orKW1 (under the policy (P, piP )),
the challenger returns ⊥, otherwise C runs Search and returns to A the output
corresponding to TknKW .
Guess The attacker outputs a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} for β. A is said to win the game if
β′ = β and the advantage is defined as: AdvCKA(A) = |Prob[β′ = β]− 12 |.
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Theorem 2. The DCP-ABSE scheme is secure with respect to the CPA against
keyword search described in Game 2.
Theorem 2. We prove that an adversary A has negligible advantage in Game 2
by reducing this game to the Selective Chosen Keyword Attack (SCKA) in [180].
The statement then holds because DCP-ABSE uses Zheng et al.’s scheme [180] to
perform keyword search.
First, we note that the main difference between Game 2 and SCKA in [180] is that
in our case the challenger not only returns the (encrypted) keyword challenge, but
also a ciphertext that might be linked to the keyword. This difference let us model
the feature of our DCP-ABSE scheme, where both keyword and data coexist. We
show that the extra information provided by C toA does not increase the adversary’s
advantage with respect to the SCKA game. Since there is no restriction about the
policy with which CT has been encrypted there are two possible scenarios: (a) A
cannot decrypt CT , and thus no information is leaked because of the security of
the ABE encryption, or (b) A has queried identities and attributes that satisfy the
decryption policy of CT . In the latter case, however, A would hold a plaintex that
is connect to either KW0 or KW1 according to the value of α. Since α is chosen
independently from β (which is the bit that A has to guess) the decryption of CT
does not provide information about the plaintext of ckw. Thus, the advantage ofA in
Game 2 is negligibly distant from the advantage of any adversary against the SCKA
game. Since the ciphertext-policy keyword-search method used in DCP-ABSE relies
on the scheme proposed in [180], and the latter is proven resilient against SCKA,
we conclude that our DCP-ABSE is also resilient against keyword attacks.
Alternatively, once clarified that CT does not influence the adversary advantage,
it is straightforward that an adversary A that wins Game 2 can be used by an
adversary B in the SCKA game to break the security of the Searchable Encryption
scheme.
5.6 Evaluation
The performance of the presented DCP-ABSE scheme is done in three different ways:
i) we first evaluate the performance of the master key computation using SMPC;
ii) secondly, we isolate each one of the cryptographic operations and compare the
computing overhead on different devices; iii) we finally run the whole protocol in a
real environment where users can be either a PC or a smartphone.
In all our evaluations we have assumed that the access policy has three attributes
connected by an AND logical gate, the users have at least four attributes, the type
of the curve is “SS512" and the evaluations have been performed taking two different
key lengths: 160 and 384 bits 2 while the length of both the encrypted data and the
keyword are 130 bytes. Additionally, each one of the tests has been run 10 times
and the final running time (given in seconds) is calculated by computing the average
time of each one of the partial tests. The SMPC routine used in the experiments
is derived from the V iff3 framework implemented in Python and has been deployed
2According to the NIST recommendations done in “NIST Special Publication 800-56A"
3Virtual Ideal Functionality Framework can be found at http://viff.dk/
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gr e(g, g) gr · gr H1(att)
160 bits
Debian 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004
Nexus 4 0.246 0.852 0.474 0.806
Moto G 0.191 0.433 0.334 0.356
384 bits
Debian 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.010
Nexus 4 0.740 1.749 1.411 0.334
Moto G 0.470 0.670 0.743 0.158
Table 5.2: Comparison of performance operations in seconds
AS KG Enc EKw Tok Dec Search
160 bits
Debian 0.019 0.008 0.033 0.058 0.048 0.016 0.016
Nexus 4 2.488 3.788 4.360 2.413 5.235 6.694 5.280
Moto G 1.129 1.549 2.200 1.450 2.921 2.559 2.196
384 bits
Debian 0.041 0.012 0.077 0.087 0.101 0.028 0.037
Nexus 4 5.649 3.159 9.570 5.501 12.364 10.558 8.937
Moto G 2.787 1.411 4.912 3.081 6.725 4.896 4.230
Table 5.3: Comparison of DCP-ABSE methods’ performance in seconds
framework [2] for the Debian implementation. Results confirm that the heaviest
operations when an ABE is used are both pairings (e(g, g)) and the H1 operation
(from the attributes set to GN), however none of the results take more than a second
to be run but the Nexus 4 with 384 bits.
Finally, we also provide a time average comparison of the DCP-ABSE methods.
In Table 5.3, AuthoritySetup (AS), KeyGen (KG), Encrypt (Enc), EncyptKey-
word (EKw), Search (Search), TokenGen (Tok) and Decrypt (Dec) methods are
tested. In this case, users can use a either a PC (debian virtual machine) or even a
smartphone (Android device). From this analysis, can be seen that even the methods
which require more computational resources can be performed by one smartphone
in a reasonable time. Furthermore, methods like AuthoritySetup or KeyGen will
only be run a few numbers of times to generate and get the keys for the system
set up while Search algorithm will usually be run by a back-end server where the
database is.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented DCP-ABSE, a new decentralized attributed based
encryption scheme. Our scheme elegantly combines encrypted keyword search and
ciphertext policy attribute based encryption. Furthermore, we discussed the security
of our scheme and tested its performances on several devices. Our experiments show
that all algorithms used by the clients in our DCP-ABSE system can be implemented
on highly constrained devices such as smartphones or ARM-based architectures. The
running time of the operations required by the algorithms highly depends on the
computational power of the chosen device, but in all the cases of study we found
acceptable results.
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The proposed DCP-ABSE scheme could find interesting applications in e-Health
scenarios, as it allows patients to associate multiple keywords to the encrypted
data collected by a WBAN. The encrypted data could then be stored in a cloud
server together with the encrypted keyword. Subsequently, the healthcare staff could
query the server to run a keyword search and retrieve the desired data. Decryption,
however, would still depend on the attributes that the staff possesses. Keyword
secrecy and Ciphertext secrecy assure the confidentiality of both the query and the
stored data.
Three directions that would be interesting to investigate in order to improve our
DCP-ABSE are related to (1) the SMPC sub-routine used in the MasterKeyGen,
(2) mitigating of the security loss caused by insider attackers and (3) reducing the
leakage of information connected to the keyword search.
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Conclusions
6.1 Summary and Conclusions
This Thesis analyses the security and privacy issues in IoT systems and more pre-
cisely in eHealth environments. In the following, the main conclusions that arise
from this dissertation are summarized and discussed.
In Chapter 2 it is shown that fingerprint-based authentication protocol proposed
in [93] by Jing Huey Khor et al. is completely insecure. An attacker, equipped
with a domestic PC, can execute a full disclosure attack in only a few minutes.
On the other hand, there is not any source of freshness in any of the messages of
the protocol, strategy that is often needed to combat replay attacks. Furthermore,
de-synchronization of the protocol is simple because the server and the tag only
keep the current session key. In fact, there is not any mechanism to recover from
a previous state when an incorrect message is received due to errors in the channel
or manipulations by an adversary. Therefore, this chapter ruins all the security
objectives that the protocol aims to offer. The experimental work carried out leads
to the following contributions:
1. Fingerprint+ protocol is presented. The security of this new protocol is for-
mally proven using BAN logic.
2. Fingerprint+ is based on both ISO/IEC 9798-2 and EPC-C1G2 (equivalently
ISO/IEC 18000-6C) standards.
In Chapter 3 with the aim of avoiding the use of non-standard constructions that
do not follow prudent design practices and established recommendations and infor-
mal and/or non-rigorous security analysis, in this chapter, two new RFID protocols
for healthcare environments based on standards and international security recom-
mendations (NIST) have been presented. The security of the mechanisms included
in these specifications has been deeply studied. The work presented leads to the
following conclusions:
1. Details about implementation aspects by following NIST security recommen-
dations are provided to develop new secure authentication protocols.
2. The security schemes proposed are based on (with slightly modifications and
tuned for our particular environment) ISO/IEC 9798 and 11770 standards,
providing more confidence than ad-hoc designs.
In Chapter 4, a publish-subscribe architecture for WBANs with particular em-
phasis in medical applications has been presented. In this domain, medical sensors
producing highly sensitive information will likely coexist with devices intended for
other purposes, such as sport or entertainment apps. The versatility offered by
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CP-ABE primitives to propose protocols that allow sensors to subscribe to the data
feeds published by other sensors is used. On the other hand, that scheme offers
a fine-grained access control through LBAC policies that are limited to AND op-
erators. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the proposed publish and command
protocols facilitate to model the principal interactions in a WBAN composed of a
variable number of devices. Regarding this work, the next conclusions are stated:
1. The privileges required to access each particular data are set by the sensor’s
policy, who can vary them depending on the context.
2. Apps and external users (e.g., healthcare staff) can get access to such data
feeds and also reconfigure or request specific data from the sensors provided
that they have sufficient privileges to do so.
3. The implementation of the underlying protocols make use of a recently pro-
posed lightweight CP-ABE scheme. As consequence of this, the entities use a
constant size decryption key which is independent of the used attributes.
4. Experimental results confirm that the scheme is suitable for most current
sensors, including ARM-based platforms.
Finally, in Chapter 5 a new decentralized attributed based encryption scheme
called Decentralized Cipher-Policy Attribute Based Searchable Encryption that also
incorporates keyword search over encrypted data is presented. Contrarily to Lewko’s
proposal [100] who was the first decentralized ABE schema, we assume that an ad-
versary cannot corrupt authorities but she can make adaptive queries. This assump-
tion is made to prevent attacks against the SMPC algorithm used in the keyword
encryption, i.e., if an authority were corrupted then the attacker would have access
to a secret master key.
On the one hand, the scheme proposed in [157] requires one central authority
to set up the system and multiple authorities are allowed whereas our scheme does
not need a central authority. On the other hand, the protocols proposed in [180]
and [96] rely on the existence of only one trusted authority controlling all attributes
and a recent schema proposed in [102] uses both a central authority and a trusted
authority. The main conclusion arisen from this work can be summarized as follows:
1. We solve the DCP-ABE main issues by adapting the original proposal to a De-
centralized Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (DCP-ABSE) pre-
sented in [100];
2. We introduce a new scheme for attribute based encryption with keyword search
based on the union of ABE and SE. Our DCP-ABSE scheme let the data owner
specify two (possibly different) policies, one for data decryption and one for
keyword search. Both policies must be satisfied in order to retrieve the original
information.
3. We prove our DCP-ABSE scheme to be resilient against a semi-honest-but-
curious server.
4. We do not lose any of the original properties presented in [137].
5. We test the performance of our proposed scheme on different devices including
smartphones and ARM-based architectures.
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6.2 Publications
During this PhD, the research work done has resulted in some scientific papers
which has been published in scientific journals and in a book chapter. This section
describes the published works and the impact or ranking of each of the journals
where they have been published.
6.2.1 Publications Related with this Thesis
P. Picazo-Sanchez, L. Ortiz-Martin, P. Peris-Lopez, and J. C. Hernandez-Castro.
Security of EPC Class-1. Security and Trends in Wireless Identification and
Sensing Platform Tags: Advancements in RFID: Advancements in RFID, page
34, 2012.
P. Picazo-Sanchez, N. Bagheri, P. Peris-Lopez, and J. E. Tapiador. Two RFID
standard-based security protocols for healthcare environments. Journal of
Medical Systems, 37(5), 2013. IF: 1.372 (Q3-ISI; Q2-SCImago)
P. Picazo-Sanchez, L. Ortiz-Martin, P. Peris-Lopez, and N. Bagheri. Weaknesses
of fingerprint-based mutual authentication protocol. Security and Communi-
cation Networks, 2014. IF: 0.720 (Q3-ISI; Q2-SCImago)
P. Picazo-Sanchez, J. E. Tapiador, P. Peris-Lopez, and G. Suarez-Tangil. Secure
publish-subscribe protocols for heterogeneous medical wireless body area net-
works. Sensors, 14(12):22619 22642, 2014. IF: 2.245 (Q1-ISI; Q2-SCImago)
6.2.2 Related Publications
P. Picazo-Sanchez, L. Ortiz-Martin, P. Peris-Lopez, J.C. Hernandez-Castro. Crypt-
analysis of the RNTS system. The Journal of Supercomputing, 65(2), 949-960.
2013. IF: 0.841 (Q2-ISI; Q3-SCImago)
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